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8. The European Social Model in a Context of Crisis and 
Austerity in Portugal  
Pilar González and António Figueiredo
1. THE FEATURES OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL IN PORTUGAL: 
RECENT, CONTEXT-DEPENDENT, UNBALANCED, ENCOMPASSING AND 
VULNERABLE
The Portuguese implementation of the European Social Model (ESM) has not been im-
mune to the effects of the Great Recession and of the austerity measures adopted sub-
sequent to the sovereign debt crisis and the bailout of the Portuguese economy. We will 
demonstrate that the Portuguese experience shows both similarities to the effects ob-
served in other countries (under adjustment conditionality or simply affected by the con-
sequences of the Great Recession for public fi nances) and very distinctive outcomes.
A large number of reasons can be invoked to explain the ambivalence of the crisis 
effects on the implementation of the ESM in Portugal. In this introductory section, the 
explanation will focus on the historical context of the ESM in Portugal, responsible for 
two main characteristics of the Portuguese model: its recent realization and its context-
dependence.
In our analysis, three main pillars of the ESM in Portugal will be analysed: the public 
education system, the national health system and social protection. Regulation of the la-
bour market will be considered as a transversal dimension, being very sensitive to growth 
dynamics. Other dimensions, such as social cohesion and the regulation of territorial 
cohesion (the territorial welfare state) are not fully developed, mainly due to their weak 
manifestation in Portugal before the arrival of democracy.
1.1 Portuguese Version of the ESM: A Recent and Context-dependent Social 
Achievement
The existence of these pillars as elements of a coherent system is a contemporary mani-
festation of 25 April 1974 revolution in Portugal and essentially of the 1976 Constitution 
that simultaneously ended the unstable post-Revolution period and started the consolida-
tion of democracy in Portugal. The Portuguese Constitution is very generous as far as so-
cial rights are concerned, being a complex mix of social and political infl uences, strongly 
marked by the revolutionary social dynamics generated by the military coup. A modern 
social state was then an aspiration completing the political and economic equality that 
inspired the new Constitutional order. 
Paradoxically, the fi rst steps towards building a welfare state in Portugal were imple-
mented at the same time that in Europe the welfare state began to be subjected to numer-
ous criticisms. The countercyclical emergence of the ESM in Portugal and the infl uence 
of a very generous Constitution as far as social rights are concerned mark the advent of 
democracy in the country and characterize the Portuguese experience until today. 
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In Portugal, the emergence of the ESM is, fi rst, an aspiration of democracy, trying to 
implement economic, political and social equality simultaneously, and second, the result 
of EU accession in 1986. The ESM was the modern reference that the new Constitution 
needed to introduce a comprehensive legal framework for equality. 
Thus the ESM in Portugal is a context-dependent as well as a recent achievement. But 
the ESM’s implementation in Portugal is also unbalanced and vulnerable.
1.2 A Very Unbalanced System
The unbalanced nature of the ESM is determined mainly by its historical development. 
This can be seen as a compromise between improvements in social policy in the last pe-
riod of the autocratic regime and new developments generated by democratic aspirations 
and the infl uence of EU accession. From the creation of a providential (contributory) 
system in 1935 to the dissolution of the autocratic regime in 1974, one cannot ignore 
that the coverage of employees against life’s contingencies, such as old age, disability 
and bereavement has been improved (Pereirinha and Carolo 2008). The pillars of public 
education and of the national health system were more incipient than the contributory 
pension system. Practical implementation of the vast and generous social rights system 
established by the 1976 Constitution worked with a very heterogeneous set of achieve-
ments from the past.
The low level of social security of Portuguese society at the beginning of the 1970s 
has been an important burden in the comprehensive implementation of a social model 
resembling the ESM. For example, although improvements were made during the last 
and pseudo-modernizing phase of the autocratic regime, social public expenditure was, 
in 1973, 5 per cent of GDP, following a sustainable trajectory of growth starting from 
2.5 per cent in 1960. In 1973, the child mortality rate was very high (44.8 per thousand 
births) and gross enrolment rates in basic (nine years) and secondary education were 46.8 
per cent and 8.4 per cent, respectively. Public expenditure on education and health in that 
same year was 1.3 per cent and 0.3 per cent of GDP, respectively. These basic fi gures 
show in rough terms how great was the social challenge of the advent of democracy.
Successive basic laws in education, health and social security made explicit the aspira-
tion to the universality of social rights established by the Constitution. Simultaneously, 
the labour dimension of the social system began to be implemented. An experimental 
form of unemployment benefi t was established in 1975. Different milestones at very dif-
ferent moments followed. The evolving trajectory of each pillar has to be understood in 
line with the political interpretation of the Constitutional aspirations sustained by each 
government and in line with the socioeconomic progress of the Portuguese economy and 
its capacity to fi nance public expenditure.
1.3 An Encompassing Model: Based on Universal Social Protection and Education
1.3.1 Social Security
As far as social security is concerned, the fi rst Framework Law dates back to 1984, estab-
lishing a budget for the general social security regime funded by the contributions of both 
employers and employees and the state budget fi nancing of the non-contributory system 
(the social system). The unique social contribution rate1 (fi rst defi ned at 11 per cent and 
1 In Portuguese Taxa Social Única (TSU).
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24 per cent applying, respectively, to employees and employers) was established in 1986. 
However, very important social achievements had been introduced before that. Regard-
ing the universality of the system, it is important to underline the creation, in 1977, of the 
social pension, a non-contributory form of social protection, targeted at people older than 
65 not covered by any other social protection regime. The social pension is usually seen 
as funding the non-contributory social protection regime (1979, 1980), establishing a 
universal guarantee of access to health and social security benefi ts, including access to the 
national family allowance, social allowances to handicapped adults and disabled minors 
and social facilities that were previously limited to means-tested support for vulnerable 
people. The legal status of private social solidarity institutions has also been established, 
asserting cooperation between regional social security centres and private institutions 
towards the supply of several forms of social care (family, children, old and handicapped 
people). This institutional element is still present today at the local level and remains very 
important in social care, tending to increase its role in a time of severe contraction of 
public social expenditure.
1.3.2 Unemployment Insurance
The unemployment insurance system was created in 1985 organised around two dimen-
sions: one (the general regime) is associated, in terms of both duration and amount, with 
the period worked, workers’ contributions and lost wages; another (a non-contributory 
modality) designated as social unemployment benefi t, targeted on vulnerable unemployed 
workers with short contribution records, low income and who have exhausted their enti-
tlement to unemployment benefi t. At the same time, policy incentives to foster the recruit-
ment of young and long-term unemployed began to be implemented. 
1.3.3 Progressively Extending Rights
Two important achievements for the coherence of the social protection system were in-
troduced in the 1990s. Independent workers gained access to social security in 1993. 
This is a very important step mainly from the perspective of adapting social security to 
labour market changes. False independent workers (the so-called recibos verdes) had 
been emerging in the Portuguese labour market as a mechanism of additional fl exibility 
in recruitment and dismissal promoted by fi rms and previously not covered by social pro-
tection. The social security regime for independent workers has been shown to be very 
important for extending social protection to atypical employment forms. Another impor-
tant achievement (1996) was the minimum guaranteed income (MGI), which remains a 
source of political controversy on the frontiers and limits of social intervention in Portu-
gal. The MGI is a very ambitious social measure involving both a monetary allowance 
and a social integration programme. Empirical research shows that it is very effective in 
reducing absolute poverty.
1.3.4 Adaptation to the ‘Social Acquis’ before Joining the EU
The 1990s was also a period of adaptation to EU rules on maternity, paternity and adop-
tion, representing a good example of convergence with the ESM’s main orientations. 
One should also mention a vast reform of disability and old age pensions, the progressive 
equalizing of the age of access to old-age pensions for men and women and the introduc-
tion of new rules for calculating pensions, reinforcing the weight of the last active years 
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of life. The creation of the dependence complement targeted at dependent disability, old 
age and surviving benefi ciaries represents progress towards higher levels of social protec-
tion to pension benefi ciaries. At the end of the decade, new orientations to social policy 
targeted at old people and the creation of the social network involving non-profi t private 
institutions and public institutions, targeted at tackling poverty and social exclusion, were 
a response to the increasing evidence of the higher level of absolute poverty that the Por-
tuguese growth model was creating. Finally, the creation of the social security fi nancial 
stabilization fund may be considered a milestone as it establishes new links between the 
fi nancial stability of the social security system and the fi nancial markets. Instability on the 
latter may through this mechanism lead to the instability of the former.
1.3.5 Latest Reforms: Combining Equity and Effi ciency
At the beginning of 2000, a second Framework Law on Social Security was adopted, 
introducing for the fi rst time effi ciency and effectiveness goals, combined with reinforce-
ment of the system’s equity. The system entered into a very unstable period with several 
basic laws rearranging the system, but tending to stabilize around three pillars: social 
protection citizenship, contributory social protection and complementary protection mo-
dalities. Unemployment, health, family allowances, maternity, paternity and adoption, 
disability and old age social protection instruments have been the objects of successive 
changes directed by effi ciency and effectiveness goals, with some occasional measures 
targeted at extending social protection coverage, such as the solidarity payment for old 
people. The fi rst political decisions were taken to integrate the diverse regimes of social 
protection (public sector workers, private employees, army) and in line with EU policy, 
the national social inclusion plans were created. Already in the crisis (2008), the creation 
of a public capitalization regime, focused on individual and voluntary participation, was 
an attempt to stimulate benefi ciaries to invest in complementary schemes.
This entire trajectory, which combined equity, effectiveness and effi ciency goals, has 
been suspended and signifi cantly changed with policy measures determined by either the 
crisis’s effects on public fi nances or the austerity policies introduced in response to the 
sovereign debt crisis and bailout conditionalities.
1.3.6 A General and Free-access National Health System
The effects of the political change in 1974 were signifi cantly broader and stronger in 
health care policy compared with the social security dimension. The intervention of the 
autocratic regime in this dimension of the welfare state had been weak and limited to 
reform of the health and assistance system (health protection was integrated in the assis-
tance system) in 1971 and to the creation of the Ministry of Health in 1973. The impulse 
of the 1976 Constitution has been decisive: a general, universal and free-access national 
health system has been the model adopted in order to guarantee the access of all to health 
protection, independent of economic status. A Ministerial Order from July 1978 and a 
National Law from November 1979 are usually pointed out as the main sources of the 
national health system (NHS), which is in our view the main landmark of the ESM in 
Portugal, principally from the point of view of the persistence of political orientation and 
improvement of the quality of the services provided. It is a very broad system, involving 
all the dimensions of health care: prevention, social care and monitoring, diagnosis and 
treatment, social and medical rehabilitation. Although conceived as a free service, its de-
sign had the merit of considering the possibility of introducing health fees as a means of 
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rationalising demand. Health fees are not generalized to every potential user of the NHS 
(numerous exemptions have been established). They are seen as an instrument to encour-
age users to share NHS costs and avoid unnecessary demand on NHS services. The NHS 
has administrative and fi nancial autonomy, with its own budget, facing increasing defi cits 
fi nanced either by transfers from the national budget or by other non-canonical methods, 
such as a long story of huge debts to private institutions (pharmacies and drugs suppliers). 
The creation (1982) of regional health administrations (at NUT II level) and the establish-
ment of a progressive network of primary health care centres (1983, 1984) in which the 
family doctor (a general practitioner) has gained increasing importance have been crucial 
to achieving the territorial diffusion of the NHS.
1.3.7 Few Nuances Introduced in the Early 1990s: Controlling Costs and Extending to 
the Private Sector
In line with the progressive increase of public health expenditure – from 2.7 per cent of 
GDP in 1978 to 5.5–5.7 per cent around the 2008 crisis – the evolution of the NHS has 
been marked by changes and concerns on the regulation of the right to access the system, 
the introduction of new management models and rules (autonomous managing bodies 
having been created), regulation of medical careers and the adoption of a vast number 
of effi ciency goals, particularly those related to drug prescriptions. It is worth stressing 
that the second Revision of the Constitution (1989) introduced a nuance in free access to 
the NHS, opening the door to the sharing of costs with the users. The new formulation is 
very suggestive: health protection is provided by a general and universal NHS, progres-
sively oriented towards a free health service model. The legislator, trapped between the 
Constitutional legacy, the need to introduce higher effi ciency and to control increases in 
health expenditure, opted for a generous and benign principle, which, as the development 
of the NHS will show, will be increasingly diffi cult to maintain together with general and 
universal access. 
The Health Framework Law of 1990 introduced another nuance: the transition from 
the right to health protection towards health conceived as a common responsibility of citi-
zens, state and civil society. This is a crucial element in understanding the new possibility 
of agreements between the state and private (profi t and non-profi t) institutions to supply 
health services. This evolution cannot be isolated from the increasing number of private 
hospitals, owned and often managed by strong Portuguese entrepreneurial groups or from 
the signifi cant increase in private health insurance systems. For example, the autonomous 
health protection system of public sector workers (ADSE) and the health system of bank 
employees allow benefi ciaries to seek private medicine with fi nancial co-participation 
from the employer.
The recategorization of nursing careers, the increased integration of primary and dif-
ferentiated health care (local health centres with technical, administrative and fi nancial 
autonomy), the reinforcement of regional health administrations and the creation of a new 
network of primary health care centres are decisive achievements of the NHS.
In sum, the evolution of the NHS in Portugal until the 2008 crisis has been dominated 
by a very diffi cult balance between implementation of the 1976 constitutional order with 
regard to health and the need to control increases in health expenditure, while respecting 
universality of access. Two main tensions have persisted during this period: the tension 
between public and private health systems and the tension between representative so-
cial actors within the system: doctors (represented by medical chambers and unions), 
nurses, managers and politicians, the latter being involved mainly due to the need to 
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rationalize the NHS network of services. This has become a source of keen local and po-
litical debate and social bargaining. Some structural features have always been present: 
the persistent increase in the relative prices of health care (mainly in sophisticated health 
technology equipment and some kinds of drugs); the low accountability of the medical 
prescriptions system; the diffi cult coexistence of managerial practices in hospitals with 
the clinical autonomy of doctors; and the tendency for doctors and nurses to seek place-
ments in the littoral urban areas of the country and their low propensity to go into the 
provinces.
1.3.8 Public Education: Challenge of Shifting from an Elitist System to One Accessible 
to All
A very high level of illiteracy, the lack of pre-school education, very low levels of gross 
and net enrolment rates in secondary education and very limited access to universities 
were the main legacy of the autocratic regime regarding education.
In the pseudo-modernization phase of the autocratic regime (fi ve years before the 
revolution) a global project to reorganize the education system was tried, involving pre-
school, basic, secondary and higher education. It was the fi rst attempt to unify secondary 
and technical schools and to break with the selective character of the latter. 
The modernization initiatives of the autocratic regime have been greatly eroded 
and lost by the reforms implemented after 1974 targeted at eliminating the elitist pat-
tern of secondary and higher education and promoting generalized and universal access 
to education. A decade of experimentation and of rejection of the past can explain 
the fact that the fi rst Basic Law on education was adopted only in 1986. Previously, 
the unifi cation of high and technical schools led to the progressive elimination of techni-
cal and vocational education. The creation of short-term higher education courses (later 
transformed into higher education polytechnic courses) is interpreted by many as com-
pensation for the disappearance of technical and vocational education at secondary 
level.
The 1986 Law and the subsequent ordinary laws established nine years of compulsory 
education organized in a sequence of three cycles of basic education and began to recover 
vocational education in a preliminary phase, considering it a special educational modality 
for young people. 
The global story of the evolution of the education and training system within the frame-
work of democracy and until the 2008 crisis can be synthesized as follows: 
• Progressive generalization of pre-school education in which the role of municipali-
ties has been crucial.
• Explosion of basic and secondary enrolment rates strongly challenging the com-
bination of quantitative (enrolment rates) and qualitative (education and training 
achievements as measured, for example, by PISA results), reinforcing the former 
and weakening the latter.
• A continuous fi ght to reduce drop-out rates.
• Strong growth in the number of teachers within the system and a corresponding 
increase in the infl uence of education trade unions, generating a typical example of 
an input-based system with a high capacity to fi x and increase public expenditure.
• Progressive implementation of a vocational education system, developing the pre-
liminary and successful experience of professional (vocational) schools and gener-
ating several vocational modalities with strong EU–ESF co-funding.
The ESM in a Context of Crisis and Austerity in Portugal
297
• Launch of a very ambitious policy programme, called the ‘New Opportunities Ini-
tiative’, targeted at certifi cating the professional experience of workers in educa-
tional qualifi cations (in the fi rst years of the initiative) and aiming in subsequent 
phases to certifi cate professional experience into professional qualifi cations.
• Supported by the ERDF, the 2007–2013 programming period of Structural Funds 
was in the 2007–2008 crisis the mechanism by which a huge programme of mod-
ernization of basic, secondary and integrated schools was launched, with a strong 
impact on the reorganization of the regional and local schools network.
1.3.9 A Highly Vulnerable Social Model: Dependent on Labour-Market and Growth 
Prospects
Finally, ESM implementation in Portugal turns out to be vulnerable to the labour market 
performance and growth prospects of the Portuguese economy. This is a corollary of three 
decades of attempts to implement a generous version of the ESM on Europe’s periphery.
We argue that the sustainability of ESM achievements in Portugal is, at present, threat-
ened not only by the generalised cuts in public funding generated by the austerity dimen-
sion of bailout conditionality, but was already in danger due to the exhaustion of the 
growth/development model before the 2008 crisis and its associated developments.
This argument may be controversial but it is the outcome of the effects of the new 
policy approaches on an often neglected feature of the Portuguese economy. In fact, even 
before the 2007–2008 crisis, Portugal was undergoing a process of signifi cant structural 
change related to: (i) structural adjustment of the country’s productive specialisation pro-
fi le linked to (re)globalisation and the effects of an overvalued euro (relative to Portugal’s 
development level); (ii) a painful transition from a period of high employment creation 
in low-qualifi ed/low wage jobs towards a new one in which the challenge is to create 
more skilled jobs in order to integrate a new input of young people much more educated 
than older population cohorts; (iii) the need to redress the allocation of private and public 
resources out of non-tradable sectors (services, infrastructure, real estate and fi nance and 
banking). These are the main reasons why Portugal must be considered, within the EU, 
as an example of a latecomer country as far as structural change is concerned (see Banco 
de Portugal 2013). 
The convergence of the undergoing structural crisis and the 2007–2008 Great Reces-
sion dramatically changed the entire context of the Portuguese economy, exacerbating the 
existing trends towards job destruction and making more complex the conditions for the 
emergence of the needed ‘social pillow’, further exacerbating social tensions and signifi -
cantly eroding social cohesion. 
The exhaustion of the growth/development model occurred simultaneously with a sig-
nifi cant change in the Portuguese labour market. Until the emergence of growth exhaus-
tion, the labour market was clearly pro-cyclical: recessions were obviously detrimental to 
both unemployment and employment rates, but recoveries were an opportunity to reduce 
the unemployment rate and to increase the employment rate in order that, peak to peak, 
structural unemployment did not change signifi cantly. The same pro-cyclical pattern was 
visible in both long-term unemployment and participation rates. In other words, growth 
showed itself to be a good substitute for active employment policies. Very dynamic fl ows 
of fi rms’ destruction and creation, new – and increasingly used – forms of atypical wage 
relations and a complex phenomenon of delaying wage payments were the main vehicles 
through which the economy compensated the rigidity fostered by labour legislation, prin-
cipally the limitations on dismissing workers in recessions.
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This labour market pattern changed signifi cantly together with the increased signs of 
exhaustion of the growth model.
The increase in the magnitude of structural unemployment is associated mainly with 
the decline of non-tradable goods sectors (mainly construction but also retail) and the 
high share of low qualifi ed people working in these activities who cannot easily fi nd a 
new job without a strong (and not always successful) investment in continuous training. 
We can understand the vulnerability of the ESM pillars in Portugal to these unfa-
vourable prospects, bearing in mind that low growth and increased structural unem-
ployment affect all the pillars of the ESM. The intensity of needs is increasing and, 
simultaneously, public action is being weakened. One example of the complexity of these 
impacts can illustrate this vulnerability: after a period of signifi cantly increasing pre-
school infrastructure at the local level, some are now facing a strong challenge to their 
fi nancial sustainability, while a signifi cant number of families with both father and 
mother unemployed are keeping the children at home, sharply reducing the demand for 
such social facilities.
2. MAIN RECENT CHANGES IN THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL MODEL (PSM)
The previous Portuguese social model (PSM) has been subject to important recent re-
forms, especially after the outbreak of the crisis and the macro-adjustment programme 
imposed by the bailout. However, it is important to stress that relevant reforms had been 
implemented in order to adapt its main institutions to emerging challenges. We will pre-
sent the main outlines of change in welfare institutions separating the period before and 
after the emergence of the crisis in order to identify any divergence in the rationale of 
changes and reforms. We shall argue that recent austerity measures risk completely de-
stroying the rationale of increasing effi ciency and effectiveness that were prevalent in 
changes before crisis.
Figure 8.1 Unemployment rate by gender, Portugal, 1983–2012 (%)
Note: a) break in series.
Source: INE, Estatisticas do emprego (EE) – 4th trimester 2012.
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2.1 Reforms before the Crisis 
In this section, we shall concentrate on the changes made before the crisis. Following 
our previous identifi cation of the main pillars of the Portuguese welfare system, we can 
provide evidence of important policy action in all of them.
2.1.1 Labour Law: Introducing ‘Flexibility’ While Keeping ‘Security’ as a Basic Work-
ers’ Right
The design of the Labour Code issuing from the 1974 revolution had, as previously stat-
ed, the security of employment as a central axis and a basic workers’ right. 
The main topic under discussion has been employment security/rigidity. Portugal has 
been classifi ed as one of the more rigid labour markets, according to the OECD index.2 
In the late 1990s–early 2000s Portugal ranked at the top with regard to employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) indicators, associated mainly with the protection of permanent 
workers against (individual) dismissal.3 Following a general trend in OECD countries, 
the 2000s have been marked in Portugal by a revision of labour regulation. In 2003, a 
new Labour Code was adopted, revised in 2009 and again in 2012, to promote fl exibility 
on the labour market, while retaining the principle of employment security as a cen-
tral axis of labour law. The main areas of change in 2003 concerned: (i) the duration of 
the normal working day (namely reducing the period of time considered as night work; 
(ii) the extension of the legal duration of fi xed-term contracts; (iii) the introduction of 
geographical mobility clauses in collective contracts; and (iv) changes in collective law 
made by introducing expiry clauses in collective agreements. The employers’ organisa-
tions supported the changes, while the two biggest trade union confederations represented 
in the Economic and Social Committee (CES) opposed the change, though with different 
positions: CGTP rejected the Labour Code proposal and abandoned the negotiations,4 
while UGT,despite its disagreement with the proposal, participated in the negotiations 
and contributed to improving it.5
Both trade union confederations claimed that the government proposal had some un-
constitutional dispositions (namely those limiting the right to strike, the impermanence 
of collective contracts and the right conferred on employers to ask for information on 
the health of workers). The Portuguese President sent the document to the Constitutional 
Court, which declared it unconstitutional on the grounds of fundamental rights stated on 
the Constitution (the right to privacy in personal life and the safeguarding of collective 
bargaining).
In March 2005, a new government was elected on a programme that included a com-
promise on the revision of the Labour Code. On the basis of research and discussions with 
the social partners,6 a tripartite agreement was signed in 2008,7 around fi ve main issues, 
with measures aimed at (i) increasing the adaptability of fi rms (fl exibility in working 
2 See OECD (2004), pp. 61–125.
3 Idem, p. 72.
4 CGTP is the oldest (dating back to the autocratic regime as a clandestine organisation) and biggest confederation of workers in 
Portugal. It is close to the Communist Party.
5 UGT is a confederation of workers created in 1978 to ensure union plurality. It is close to the Socialist Party and also the Social-
Democratic Party.
6 Dornelas et al. (2006) and Comissão do Livro Branco das Relações Laborais (2007).
7 The government, four employers’ organisations (Manufacturing and Construction Confederation, Trading Confederation, Tourism 
Confederation and Agriculture Confederation) and one of the trade union confederations (UGT) signed the agreement. The employ-
ers’ confederations, despite their recognition of the agreement, publicly stated that they would want more changes, namely regarding 
individual and collective dismissal and short-term contracts (Lima 2008: 1–2).
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time arrangements for fi rms but also for workers on the grounds of more family-friendly 
parental leave options); (ii) promoting collective agreements; (iii) rationalising and rein-
forcing the security of both parties in the event of dismissals (mainly by simplifying and 
reducing the duration of the dismissal process); (iv) improving the effectiveness of labour 
law (namely by improving inspection of workplaces and fi ghting against illegal work); 
and (v) fi ghting precariousness and segmentation in the labour market and promoting 
decent work. 
2.1.2 Social Dialogue: Series of Tripartite Agreements
Reform of the Labour Code evolved in parallel with the increasing institutionalisation 
and visibility of social dialogue. The standing committee for social conciliation (CPCS), 
organised within (although independently) the economic and social committee (CES), 
played a very important role. Important progress in social dialogue and prevention of so-
cial confl ict has been intermediated through institutionalised discussion within the CPCS 
and CES. Also in 2006, other important agreements were achieved by all social partners 
(CGTP included) on minimum wages. This agreement recognised the ‘low value of the 
existing minimum wage in Portugal as well as the desirability of its gradual increase’ and 
the ‘importance of defi ning the evolution of the monetary value of the minimum wage 
on a medium-term basis in order to ensure both predictability and trust for fi rms and 
workers’ (CES, 2006:1). The social partners and the government decided to increase the 
minimum wage to 403 euros a month in 20078 and to agree on the values of 450 euros and 
500 euros to be achieved in 2009 and 2011,9 respectively.
This was a signifi cant characteristic of the time before the crisis: increasing trust be-
tween the social partners had been accumulated in this process of institutional social dia-
logue, as compared with the confl ictive pattern of the 1970s, the 1980s and, largely, the 
1990s, and which was to be destroyed by the crisis and austerity policies. 
2.1.3 Social Security and Health Systems under Reform to Ensure Sustainability
In 2006, a tripartite agreement (within the CPCS) on social security reform was also 
implemented to take into account several variables,10 such as population ageing, the pro-
gressive increase in contributory periods and the growth of pensions at a higher rate than 
that of contributions, and also to reinforce the sustainability of the social security system 
considered as a fundamental pillar of the Portuguese social model.11 
The social security reform also introduced a sustainability index12 (linked to the in-
crease of life expectancy) to be used in the calculation of pensions, and for means-tested 
social benefi ts defi ned according to the PIB growth rate and consumer prices. The princi-
ple of maximum value for public pensions was also defi ned (12 times the IAS) as well as 
the principle of convergence of existing regimes: the general and the public sector work-
ers’ regimes. The early and mid-2000s were also characterised by changes in unemploy-
ment benefi ts, family pay, parental leave and poverty prevention among the elderly. In 
brief, before the crisis social security was undergoing reform to ensure its sustainability, 
8 In 2006 the value of the minimum wage was 385.90 euros.
9 The 2011 goal has not yet been achieved.
10 The fi nal agreement has not been signed by CGTP (this confederation had signed the preliminary agreement on the strategic 
outlines of social security reform but did not sign the fi nal one, arguing that it would imply the reduction of pensions). All the other 
social partners signed the agreement.
11 CES, 2007: 2.
12 The IAS – Social Sustainability Index.
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an achievement that has been recognized in some international surveys (mainly OECD). 
Similarly structural reforms concerning pensions had also been undertaken in 2007. 
As for social security, the reorganisation and rationalization of the national health sys-
tem (SNS) was targeted at increasing its effi ciency and fi nancial sustainability and, at the 
same time, ensuring its quality and universality.13 The main areas of change concerned: 
implementation of the national network of integrated continuous care14 (namely to de-
velop a more adequate response to the increasing number of elderly people); the creation 
of a national network of health care centres providing primary health care to families; 
reorganisation of the national network of public hospitals in terms of the provision of 
emergency services; reorganisation of the SNS at national, regional and local levels; in-
troduction of fees to be paid by users of the SNS defi ned as a ‘moderation rate’, aimed 
at rationalizing and regulating access to health care, while reinforcing social justice as a 
prevalent principle of the SNS (many users are not covered by this fee either for health 
care reasons or family income reasons).15
2.1.4 Education: Pre-crisis Reforms Oriented towards Higher Effi ciency
One of the main structural features of the pre-crisis measures in this sector are related to 
the reorganisation of the education system in order to concentrate resources on bigger 
institutions providing different grades of education. This was expected to increase ef-
fi ciency as it allowed scale effects and also the closure of a signifi cant number of widely 
dispersed small schools. The introduction of an adequate scale in education providers 
would also allow more adequate provision of complementary education in the regions. 
These measures evolved in parallel with new local procedures to guarantee transportation 
to students and huge investment in the renovation of school buildings and facilities, partly 
(but importantly) supported by European Structural Funds (ERDF).
The rationalization of the system has also taken place through the introduction of an 
evaluation system among teachers, aimed at making it more adequate and not simply 
relying on administrative rules and procedures. This has been a very tense process, with 
a lot of confl icts and strong mobilization of teachers by their strong unions. This process 
has had ambivalent (and fairly extreme) effects on public opinion. 
2.1.5 Reorganization in the Public Sector
In the 2000s and long before the crisis, Portugal implemented signifi cant reforms targeted 
at improving public administration by reorganising it and reducing public expenditure. 
The OECD has classifi ed the Portuguese public administration reform as ‘ambitious’, 
stating that it ‘is a major component of the budgetary consolidation strategy [that] goes 
beyond fi scal consolidation, to include enhancement of the quality of public services and 
strengthening the governance of public institutions.’16
This reform has been designed in two main areas: (i) reorganization of central ad-
ministration (in the PRACE programme) that aimed at reorganising and simplifying the 
structure of public services and making them more user-friendly (individuals and fi rms), 
reducing redundancies (namely by sharing services) and promoting e-government; and 
13 Information in this section is based on the offi cial site of the Portuguese Ministry of Health, see: http://www.portaldasaude.pt/
portal/conteudos/a+saude+em+portugal/servico+nacional+de+saude/historia+do+sns/historiadosns.htm
14 A joint initiative of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Employment and Social Solidarity. 
15 Those with chronic diseases and pregnant women, for example.
16 OECD (2008), p. 47.
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(ii) reform of human resource management with regard to careers and contracts, the intro-
duction of the so-called ‘mobility pool’ and a recruitment-limiting rule for public workers 
(one new recruitment for every two leaving).
2.2 Positive Evaluation of Pre-crisis Reforms
The reforms implemented in the 2000s have been favourably evaluated by the main inter-
national organizations: OECD, the IMF and the European Commission. 
In fact, according to the OECD (2008: 63):
Portugal has made very good progress in reducing the fi scal defi cit, using a wide ranging 
programme of structural reforms that will continue to pay dividends well into the future. 
Challenges that remain to anchor results achieved and reduce the defi cit further include: 
fully implementing the human resources reform in the public administration; improving 
effi ciency in the SOE sector; further closing the fi nancing requirement in the contributory 
pension defi cit; and tackling ongoing pressures of ageing on the health budget.
Also, the IMF (2008:1) has stated that:
Decisive action, focused on the government sector, is being taken to address the imbalances 
accumulated during the 1990s, and results are being seen. Weaker global conditions make 
addressing Portugal’s economic challenges both more diffi cult and urgent. Policies should 
build on recent achievements, and avoid jeopardizing long-term goals for short-term gain.
 
Finally, according to the European Commission (2008: 27):
The Commission [...] considered that the action taken by Portugal in response to the Coun-
cil recommendation represented adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive 
defi cit. In particular, Portugal (i) achieved a 2005 defi cit outturn as planned; (ii) adopted a 
comprehensive package of corrective measures which, provided full and effective imple-
mentation, was in line with the required structural adjustment in 2006; (iii) confi rmed the 
defi cit target for 2008 below 3% of GDP and a structural adjustment path in accordance 
with the Council recommendation; (iv) implemented or initiated expenditure-containing 
measures and kept fi scal targets in spite of a more cautious assessment of GDP growth 
prospects; (v) planned to bring government debt back on a declining path as from 2008; and 
(vi) took action to improve the quality of public fi nance statistics.
Thus reform in the pre-crisis period was unanimously approved. In particular, the IMF 
considered it important not to introduce short-term biases that could compromise the me-
dium-term benefi ts of the changes. The ESM in Portugal was an evolving reality towards 
higher effi ciency of public expenditure and also showed (at least preliminary) achieve-
ments aimed at adapting it to structural challenges common to most EU countries.
2.3 Austerity Policies during the Recession 
2.3.1 Lower Growth 
To contextualise the present it is useful to take into account the evolution of the Portu-
guese economy in recent decades (Figure 8.2). 
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Since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century Portugal has had fairly anaemic eco-
nomic growth contrasted with higher growth in other EU countries, especially other 
southern European ones (Figure 8.3). The rather slow growth went together with a pro-
cyclical and fairly low unemployment rate (by EU standards) that has been one of the 
main characteristics of the Portuguese labour market in recent decades. Nevertheless, 
since the beginning of the new century, the unemployment rate has been increasing slow-
ly but consistently.
Three other important structural characteristics of the Portuguese labour market are 
worth noting: (i) low wages by EU standards; (ii) low educational attainment of the la-
bour force; and (iii) high incidence of temporary contracts,17 which appear to be the main 
contractual form for promoting fl exibility (normally corresponding to higher employment 
precarity) in the use of labour (the share of temporary employees in 2012 was 13.7 per 
17 According to EUROSTAT temporary employment includes work under a fi xed-term contract, as against permanent work where 
there is no end-date.
Figure 8.2 Annual GDP growth rate and unemployment rate, Portugal, 1983–2012
Note: (a) break in the series for the unemployment rate.
Source: PORDATA.
Figure 8.3 GDP growth rates, Portugal and selected EU countries, 1996–2014
Source: EUROSTAT [nama_gdp_k].
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cent in the EU27 and 20.7 per cent in Portugal; in that same year only Spain and Poland 
had a higher share, at 23.7 per cent and 26.9 per cent, respectively).18 
2.3.2 Structural Unemployment But Less Access to Unemployment Benefi ts
The fairly slow growth went together with a pro-cyclical and low unemployment rate (by 
EU standards) that has been one of the main characteristics of the Portuguese labour mar-
ket in recent decades. However, since the beginning of the new century, the unemploy-
ment rate has been increasing slowly but consistently. The year 2008 represented the start 
of a huge unemployment increase that raised the unemployment rate to unprecedented 
levels, from 7.7 per cent in 2008 to 15.7 per cent in 2012, extending into 2013 (in the fi rst 
trimester of 2013 it reached 17.7 per cent,19 but fell in the last months of the year). 
Data on the number of families that have both parents unemployed show a dark picture 
refl ecting a particularly vulnerable situation:20 it rose consistently from 1,530 couples in 
October 2010 to 13,176 in April 2013.21
The unemployment rate, having increased in all age groups, is especially high for 
young people (currently around 40 per cent).22 Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that 
the biggest contributors to unemployment are older people (aged 45 and over), who repre-
sented 30.4 per cent of total unemployment in 2012, and the low educated, who accounted 
for 60 per cent of total unemployment in that same year (old unemployed people tend to 
have a lower education).
 
Table 8.1 Unemployment rate by age group and educational level, Portugal , 2003–
2012 (%)
2003 2006 2009 2012
Unemployment rate 
Total 6.3 7.7 9.5 15.7
By age group
15 to 24 14.5 16.3 20.0 37.7
25 to 34 7.5 9.1 10.9 18.1
35 to 44 5.1 6.3 8.5 13.4
45 and more 3.6 5.4 7.0 11.5
By educational level
Basic 6.2 7.7 10.1 16.2
Secondary 6.9 8.5 9.6 17.6
Tertiary 6.0 6.3 6.4 11.9
Source: INE, Estatísticas do emprego, fourth trimester 2012.
Also it is important to note that the long-term unemployed currently represent the 
highest share of the unemployed, as well as that 90 per cent of Portuguese unemployed 
are people in the labour market looking for a new job (Figure 8.4). 
18 EUROSTAT [lfsa_etpga]
19 INE, Estatísticas do Emprego, 1st trimester 2013.
20 Given the precariousness of this situation unemployment benefi t is calculated, since 2011, taking this element into account.
21 IEFP, Informação mensal sobre estado civil do desempregado e condição laboral do cônjuge.
22 INE, Estatísticas do Emprego, 4th trimester 2012.
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A signifi cant threat to social cohesion, unemployment increased together with a fall 
in the share of the unemployed covered by unemployed benefi ts: a gap emerged between 
these two groups due to both the high unemployment and the changes introduced in the 
legislation on unemployment benefi ts. In 2008, 61 per cent of Portuguese unemployed 
received unemployment benefi t in comparison with 46 per cent in 2012).23 
2.3.3 Wages and Income Distribution: The role of the Minimum Wage
Portugal is a low-wage country in EU terms. Figure 8.5 shows that in 2010 average gross 
hourly earnings in Portugal were the lowest in the EU15.24
Despite the measurement diffi culties, the available empirical data show that Portugal 
has a gender pay gap in line with (or even lower than) the EU average.25 However, the 
recent trend in the EU has been towards a falling gender pay gap (17.3 per cent in 2008 
Figure 8.4 Unemployed by type and duration of search, Portugal, 2012 (%)
Source: INE, Estatísticas do emprego, 4th trimester 2012.
Figure 8.5 Average hourly earnings, Portugal and selected EU countries, 2010
Source: Eurostat.
23 INE, Estatísticas do Emprego – 4º trimestre 2012.
24 This has been a persistent characteristic of the country.
25 EUROSTAT data on the unadjusted gender pay gap refer to private fi rms employing 10 or more employees. 
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and 16.2 per cent in 2011),26 while in Portugal the recent evolution shows an increase (8.5 
per cent in 2007 to 12.5 per cent in 201127).28 
Besides the low average wage the pay system in Portugal is also characterised by a 
high incidence of low wages, which also have a gender bias (Table 8.2), although mini-
mum wage policies have had an important effect on sustaining the incomes of low quali-
fi ed workers. Available data show a tendency towards a higher incidence of workers paid 
at the minimum level, especially among women, young people and fi xed-term employ-
ment.29  
Table 8.2 Low wage earners as a proportion of total employees, Portugal, 2006 and 2010
Portugal Euro area
Total Male Female Total Male Female
2006 20.7 15.4 26.4 14.4 10.3 19.6
2010 16.1 10.2 22.1 14.8 11.0 19.2
Source: EUROSTAT [earn_ses_pub1s].
A major debate has been taking place in Portugal on the effects of minimum wages. 
In fact, a social pact had been signed in 2010 between the government, the employers’ 
associations and trade union confederations in order to increase the minimum wage to 
500 euros by the end of 2011. That increase has not been achieved, however, due to the 
austerity measures.
2.3.4 Public Accounts Deteriorating 
The evolution of fi scal policy and of the consequent indebtedness of the Portuguese econ-
omy (Figures 8.6 and 8.7) has been under particular European control since the launch of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
26 EUROSTAT [earn_gr_gpgr2].
27 Idem.
28 However, this evolution has to be taken with some caution because the data concern only fi rms with at least 10 employees, reduc-
ing their representativeness. Using national data covering all the private fi rms with at least one employee the evolution over recent 
years shows a fairly stable (slightly decreasing ) gender wage gap in the past decade (GEP/MTSS, Quadros de Pessoal, 2010).
29 Carneiro et al. (2011).
Figure 8.6 Government defi cit as a percentage of GDP, Portugal, 2003–2012
Source: EUROSTAT [[gov_dd_edpt1].
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Portugal in recent times has not had a defi cit complying with the Sustainability and 
Growth Pact (SGP).30 However, the situation has varied over time: (i) an increase in the 
defi cit until 2005 leading to a peak of the defi cit in that year; (ii) a signifi cant reduction 
in the defi cit until 2007 and a slight increase in 2008; (iii) a huge increase in 2009, hardly 
changing in 2010; (iv) a big decrease in 2011; but (v) a new increase in 2012 reaching the 
peak value of 2005. 
Before the 2008 crisis, Portugal was able to achieve signifi cant fi scal consolidation, 
whose sustainability was reversed immediately after 2008, not only because the control of 
public expenditure lacked consistency but also due to a dramatically low growth rate (see 
Figure 8.2) and increasing social pressure resulting from rising unemployment. Notwith-
standing the very tough austerity measures and the reduction of the public defi cit, public 
indebtedness does not show a positive trend due, among other things, to the still unstable 
fi nancial market conditions and the additional debt due to the bailout.
In general terms Portugal has had an anaemic GDP growth rate, an increasing unem-
ployment rate, a public defi cit and public debt before the crisis above the Stability and 
Growth Pact. All these indicators (with the exception of the defi cit in 2011) have got 
worse, reinforcing the vulnerability of the Portuguese social model.
Given the high social costs and declining social cohesion, the Portuguese economy is 
desperately seeking a diffi cult balance between sustainable progress with fi scal consoli-
dation and the need to maintain growth and social cohesion. The rationale and concrete 
implementation of austerity measures are hardly evolving in that direction.
2.3.5 Austerity Policy Design
Since 2010 and in response to the development of the sovereign debt crisis and the EU 
summits, the bailout conditionality forced Portugal to implement packages of austerity 
measures essentially aimed at reducing the public budget defi cit and at preventing an in-
crease of Portuguese indebtedness.
30 This applies to comparative data since 1995.
Figure 8.7 Government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP, Portugal, 
2003–2012
Source: EUROSTAT [[gov_dd_edpt1].
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A shift in EU policy
In fact this corresponded to a change in European policy regarding the crisis. As stated by 
the European Commission (2010: 1):
The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was endorsed by the European Council in 
December 2008 and introduced a sizeable discretionary fi scal stimulus aiming to boost de-
mand and stimulate confi dence over 2009–10. The majority of stimulus measures in 2009 
and 2010 are temporary and are planned to expire by 2011. These temporary measures have 
had positive effects on employment and economic activity during the crisis, by supporting 
private demand and maintaining fundamentally sound activities and jobs that could oth-
erwise have been lost. However, once economic growth resumes on a durable basis, such 
measures if left in place would add up to an intolerable burden for the public fi nances; they 
could also hinder adjustment processes within and across sectors by subsidising existing 
fi rms and specifi c productions.
This change in the European strategy to fi ght the crises is referred by Caldas (2013:1) as 
corresponding to the shift from an ‘economic stage’ (December 2008 to February 2010) 
when the fi ght against the crisis involved a (temporary) fi scal stimulus to a ‘budget stage’, 
when the policy concerns ‘were transferred from the economic recovery to the euro and 
eurozone stability by means of recovering market trust through a coordinated budget 
consolidation in the EU’. The year 2010 did, in fact, see the adoption of a new European 
policy to face the crisis, as is clearly expressed by the European Commission (2009: 3):
Ministers agreed at the Informal Ecofi n in Göteborg of 20 October 2009 on the need for 
a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach on exit strategies, encompassing measures to 
rebuild a stable and viable fi nancial sector, ensure fi scal sustainability and to raise potential 
output. As to the fi scal exit strategy, it was agreed that substantial fi scal consolidation was 
required beyond the withdrawal of the stimulus measures of the European Economic Re-
covery Programme in order to halt and eventually reverse the increase in debt and restore 
sound fi scal positions.
It was, in fact, a sudden change of EU policy orientation. Portugal followed in strict terms 
the initial orientation towards a fi scal stimulus, which partly explains the increase in pub-
lic expenditure between 2008 and 2010.
Pre-Troika austerity 
Austerity measures began to be adopted in March 2010. The main changes introduced in 
these programmes are synthesised in Table 8.5 in the annex. 
In March 2011, a new programme (PEC) was proposed but subsequently rejected in 
Parliament by the opposition. Following this rejection the government presented its res-
ignation. About a month later the government, still functioning, asked for fi nancial help 
from the European Commission. Negotiations with the Troika were carried out by the 
government (Socialist Party) and two centre-right (PSD, Social Democratic Party) and 
right-wing parties (CDS-PP, Popular Party). The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
was signed by these three parties and the Troika, representing an important political com-
promise between the main political actors in Portugal, in a process that has been under-
stood as an important indication of political cohesion in the country.
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Memorandum of Understanding
On 8 April 2011, Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers issued a statement clarifying that 
EU (European Financial Stabilization Mechanism) and euro-area (European Financial 
Stability Facility) fi nancial support would be provided on the basis of a policy programme 
supported by strict conditionality and negotiated with the Portuguese authorities, duly 
involving the main political parties, by the Commission in liaison with the ECB, and the 
IMF. Further to the EU support from the EFSM, loans from the European Financial Sta-
bility Facility (EFSF) will contribute to the fi nancial assistance. The Loan Facility Agree-
ment on the EFSF fi nancing contribution will specify that the disbursements thereunder 
are subject to the compliance with the conditions of this Memorandum (MoU 2011: 1).
The MoU31 states clearly that the conditions negotiated are to be evaluated and imple-
mented strictly. It also details a number of objectives focused on the labour market.
The document is organised in terms of seven main points: (i) fi scal policy; (ii) fi nan-
cial sector regulation and supervision; (iii) fi scal-structural measures (including, among 
other things, public administration and health care); (iv) labour market and education; 
(v) goods and services markets; (vi) housing; and (vii) framework conditions (including 
judicial system competition, public procurement and business environment).
General objectives and very detailed targets are established. The Memorandum (MoU, 
2011: 22) lays down labour market measures to:
Revise the unemployment insurance system to reduce the risk of long-term unemployment 
while strengthening social safety nets; reform employment protection legislation to tackle 
labour market segmentation, foster job creation, and ease the transition of workers across 
occupations, fi rms, and sectors; ease working time arrangements to contain employment 
fl uctuations over the cycle, better accommodate differences in work patterns across sectors 
and fi rms, and enhance fi rms’ competitiveness; promote labour cost developments consist-
ent with job creation and enhanced competitiveness; ensure good practices and appropriate 
resources to Active Labour Market Policies to improve the employability of the young and 
disadvantaged categories and ease labour market mismatches.
It also refers to the need to:
Address early school leaving and improve the quality of secondary education and voca-
tional education and training, with a view to raise the quality of human capital and facilitate 
labour market matching.
It includes explicit reference to the fact that:
Reforms in labour and social security legislation will be implemented after consultation of 
social partners, taking into account possible constitutional implications, and in respect of 
EU Directives and Core Labour Standards.
In particular, four main aspects of the MoU should be underlined. The fi rst is that 
unemployment and employment security and working time arrangements, despite the 
pre Troika changes introduced in all of them, appear as top intervention areas, alongside 
31 Three documents and a letter of intent compose the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal. The documents are the fol-
lowing: (i) Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MFEP); (ii) Memorandum of Understanding on Specifi c Economic 
Policy Conditionality (MoU); and (iii) Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). All of them are included in EC (2011).
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active labour market policies; second, the MoU also highlights the importance of improv-
ing human capital; third, it explicitly addresses the importance of social dialogue; and 
fi nally it explicitly refers to the need to consider the constitutional implications of the 
measures to be implemented.
After the signing of the MoU the social partners retained a willingness to negotiate 
that is expressed in a Tripartite Agreement on Competitiveness and Employment (Janu-
ary 2012).
The Tripartite Agreement on Competitiveness and Employment (January 2012 ), 
signed by the government, the employers’ confederations and one of the trade union con-
federations, gave important social support to the forthcoming reforms. However, the dif-
fi culties in concluding this agreement can be inferred from its need to rely on the more 
general statements of the previous 2011 agreement (under the previous government).
Austerity measures even beyond the Troika’s demands 
The political parties supporting the new government based their election campaign on 
the ideas that ‘cutting wages and fi ring workers will not be necessary to comply with the 
MoU’,32 and ‘any tax adjustment if needed will be done through indirect taxes and not by 
income taxes’.33
According to the MoU, the measures to be implemented in 2011 were in the existing 
public budget. Nevertheless, the government decided to go ‘beyond the Troika’, imple-
menting two extraordinary measures in 2011: (i) 3.5 per cent extra tax on income and (ii) 
raising VAT on energy. 
The measures implemented subsequently have emphasized wages and pension cuts (es-
pecially for public sector workers). Tax increases have also been persistent (Table 8.6 in 
the Annex).
As policy measures were taken mainly in response to pressing short-term needs (related 
to the Troika evaluation meetings) they have often been designed to ensure short-term re-
sults. Most of the changes aimed at an immediate increase in receipts (tax rates, especially 
of indirect taxes, have been increased) and cuts in public expenditure (cuts in the wages 
of public sector employees, freezing of new hires and promotions, freezing of insurance 
benefi ts and pensions, reduction of means-tested unemployment assistance, family ben-
efi t and social assistance).
3. MAIN OUTCOMES
Turning to the main effects of austerity policies and the changes brought to the European 
Social Model in Portugal we can identify a number of different outcomes.
3.1 Social Unrest and Institutional Instability
3.1.1 A Series of General Strikes and Spontaneous Demonstrations
Portugal has maintained an image of social stability since the intervention of the Troika. 
In fact, opposition to the implemented measures has not been extreme or violent. But this 
does not mean it does not exist. Several streets demonstrations have occurred since the 
32 Prime minister’s press statement on 30 April 2011.
33 Prime minister’s press statement on 24 June 2011.
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beginning of austerity policy, especially two big demonstrations in 2012. Three general 
strikes (November 2010, November 2011 and June 2013) have been organised uniting 
the two trade union confederations for the fi rst time in 22 years. All of them had high par-
ticipation, particularly in 2010 and 2011.34 The fact that austerity measures did unite the 
trade union confederations that, in recent times, have followed diverse strategies (UGT 
dialogue with governments and employers’ confederations and CGTP a more rigid posi-
tion towards negotiations and a more radical position on strikes) is an important outcome 
of austerity in Portugal.
3.1.2 Political and Institutional Instability
Political stability, which has also been considered one of the main advantages of the Por-
tuguese context, has also been undermined by confl icts. Two episodes appear decisive in 
clearly opening up political instability and, by this means, social stability and institutional 
instability as well.
The fi rst episode was the cut in employers’ contributions to social security (TSU) in 
September 2012. This measure was included in the MFEP (EC, 2011: 41–57) under the 
heading Fiscal Devaluation: 
A critical goal of our programme is to boost competitiveness. This will involve a major 
reduction in employer’s social security contributions. [...] The offsetting measures needed 
to ensure fi scal neutrality may include changing the structure and rates of VAT, additional 
permanent expenditure cuts, and raising other taxes that would not have an adverse effect 
on competitiveness. (EC 2011: 52)
3.1.3 Measures Declared Unconstitutional but Followed by Additional Cuts
The second episode begins in September 2012 and following a declaration of unconsti-
tutionality by the Constitutional Court on the abolition of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
month pay to public employees and to pensioners (on the grounds they did not com-
ply with the Constitutional principle of equal treatment), the prime minister announced 
new budget measures to counterbalance this decision.35 Subsequently, the Constitutional 
Court, considering the timing of the decision, decided that the measure would not apply 
in 2012 but only in the following years.
Following this the prime minister, referring explicitly to the Constitutional Court’s 
new decision, stated that ‘the 2013 Budget will have to include another combination of 
charges and sacrifi ces. The government has decided to increase private sector workers’ 
social security contribution to 18 per cent, allowing as a counterpart a decrease in em-
ployers’ social security contributions also to 18 per cent. [...]. The increase of 7 percent-
age points in workers’ contributions36 will also apply to public employees.’37 
3.1.4 Social Partners’ Discontent
The social partners reacted immediately with heavy criticism of this direct redistribution 
of income from workers to employers, on both the employers’ and the workers’ side. The 
34 For the fi rst time in 22 years, the two confederations joined in the call for a general strike. 
35 Idem. 
36 For the employers the variation was 5.75 percentage points.
37 Prime Minister’s statement on 7 September 2012.
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head of the Manufacturing and Construction Employers’ Confederation has been particu-
larly harsh, saying that ‘the pillar of social stability coordinated market economy under 
attack’ and that ‘the social partners cannot be used to sign agreements and then not be 
heard when it comes to decision-making’.38
Increased tension and signs of distrust can be discerned in social dialogue. Further-
more, this controversy concerning the TSU has made public clear signs of an increasing 
tension amongst the two parties in the government. 
In June 2013, the four employers’ confederations represented on social dialogue com-
mittees publicly presented a document criticizing the austerity policies. A few quotations 
illustrate their strong rejection of the austerity path:
It is urgent to reconcile government targets with reality [...]. The fi scal consolidation policy 
continues to be based on a reduction of domestic demand, an unwise tax increase and 
scarce fi nancing opportunities for small and medium-sized fi rms [...]. Austerity has been a 
short-term answer (implemented as if it was the only possible answer) but nowadays, given 
its results, it would be irresponsible to pursue or, even worse, to further develop this ap-
proach [...] we cannot insist on a policy that is not a solution for Portugal and from which, 
if we insist on it, there can be no way back.39 
3.1.5 Criticisms of Austerity within the Government Itself
Furthermore, in July 2013 the resignation of the Minister of State and Finance (1 July) 
(accepted) took place, followed by the resignation of the Minister of State and Foreign 
Affairs (2 July) (not accepted). The Minister of Finance’s letter of resignation has been 
made public and expresses opinions that refer explicitly to a confl ict between the govern-
ment and the Constitutional Court and of tensions within the government.
The Minister stated that:
In a resignation letter one must refl ect on one’s own limitations and responsibilities. Non-
compliance with the limits on the public defi cit and the debt in 2012 and 2013 was due to a 
very strong decrease in internal demand, together with a change in its composition, leading 
to a strong decrease in tax receipts. The repetition of these deviations undermined my cred-
ibility as Minister of Finance.40
Thus he resigned with a clear critical assessment of the austerity policy. The prime min-
ister’s decision to designate a new Minister among the closer members of the previous 
Ministers’ team and clearly linked to the policy design followed until then was also a 
catalyst of the resignation of the third most important fi gure in the government.41 These 
episodes have introduced increased mistrust between policy agents and political parties.
3.2 Unemployment Crisis without the Tools to Solve It
The huge increase in unemployment and its structural dimension is the major (and bad) 
novelty of the recent Portuguese economic and social situation. It has not been generated 
by the austerity policies (as unemployment was increasing before their implementation) 
38 Statement by António Saraiva to Rádio Renascença, 17 September 2012.
39 CAP, CCP, CIP e CTP unidas por um compromisso para o crescimento económico em Portugal, press conference, 24 June 2013.
40 Vitor Gaspar’s letter to the Prime Minister, 1 July 2013. 
41 Paulo Portas, Minister of State and Foreign Affairs.
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but they have contributed to its increase. Under this new situation of massive unemploy-
ment, the welfare state would be expected to implement policies (both passive and active) 
to support the unemployed. However, under austerity, the percentage of the unemployed 
not receiving unemployment benefi ts has increased strongly. Partly this has been the out-
come of revision of the regulation on unemployment benefi ts, considered too generous 
and designed in a way that could be considered an incentive to voluntary unemployment. 
Reform of this measure, in keeping with the aim of establishing disincentives to volun-
tary unemployment, in a context of mass unemployment  could hardly be understood by 
the population. Under mass unemployment, voluntary unemployment, even if it existed, 
is necessarily residual. If such a reform of unemployment benefi t had to be introduced 
in this period of high unemployment and low employment security, the argument would 
have to be based on social solidarity: under pressure of external fi nancing constraints 
and the economic downturn, reforms were needed in order to distribute scarce resources 
among the unemployed in a more equitable way. 
The same logic applies to cuts in means-tested benefi ts, namely family benefi ts and 
minimum income. With very high poverty rates (particularly for children) it is hard to 
understand why family and minimum income benefi ts have to be frozen (reduced). 
3.3 Public Sector Affected
3.3.1  Income Cuts Leading to Demotivation Especially among Public Sector Employees
Income cuts are also diffi cult to understand. They were largely accepted in a fi rst stage, 
when they were presented as a temporary need of a country facing huge fi nancial con-
straints and designed in a clear and understandable progressive way. It became diffi cult to 
understand when minimum wages were kept frozen and the cuts became more and more 
concentrated on public sector workers, who have been increasingly presented as a privi-
leged group. The simultaneity of cuts in wages, increases in working time, changes in ca-
reers and freezing of promotion has been often represented as unfair compared with other 
social groups. Fairly often, the most important argument has not relied on the need for re-
forms to rationalize and improve services (clearly supported by evidence), but essentially 
on the need to reduce the public budget. These changes have increased the vulnerability 
and sense of unfair treatment of public sector workers, with obvious expected effects on 
their motivation and so on their productivity. This is particularly evident among teachers.
3.3.2 Lower Quality of Public Services
Public education faces increased problems because teachers (and other education profes-
sionals) are less motivated and public schools face new problems (in a time of crisis with 
mass unemployment and high poverty rates, a lot of family disruption generates a diffi cult 
learning environment). In a period in which schools need more fully committed profes-
sionals jobs are being cut and the number of students in the classroom is increasing. 
In the health care system the reforms seem less contradictory. Demotivation of health 
professionals exists, but decisions on careers have been discussed with professional 
boards in the health sector, leading to less tension compared with the education sector. 
Also the recent sustainable trend of falling prices has proved very important in guarantee-
ing access to drugs in a context of cuts and freezes in wages and pensions. (A sustainable 
trend to reduce drug prices is discernible and has been an important counterpoint to the 
cuts and freezes in wages and pensions.) 
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3.3.3 The Troika Halting Development of the Education System
The effects of the 2008 crisis and of subsequent sovereign debt developments has em-
broiled the education system in disputes, along with an increased number of registered 
unemployed teachers partly due to a signifi cant fall of the number of young people of 
school age. The political change after the signing of the Technical Memorandum with the 
Troika generated additional sources of political and social bargaining: (i) the New Op-
portunities Initiative presented in previous sections was suspended in order to be revised 
and to tackle the criticism generated by its extension; (ii) the employability goals gained 
a political impulse, revising priorities and choices between education and training instru-
ments; (iii) the plurality of vocational education has been criticised and vocational educa-
tion courses in regular secondary schools became the main priority of the vocational sys-
tem; (iv) the enrolment in vocational education courses of more vulnerable young people 
facing complex and diverse risks of social exclusion introduced additional diffi culties, 
challenging regular schools; (v) a preliminary, although not yet implemented experiment 
to introduce an education voucher targeted at more disadvantaged young people, allow-
ing them to choose between public and private schools, led to a general dispute between 
those that consider public schools to be the main pillars of the education system and those 
who believe that private and cooperative schools may play a role in it. Probably, the fi ght 
to reduce school drop-outs is the most generally agreed goal within the system, despite 
generating some controversy as far the solutions to tackle the problem are concerned.
This context should be considered when analysing the social crisis effects of the bail-
out-related austerity measures in the education pillar of the ESM in Portugal. As far as 
human resources are concerned, the education system is now facing the consequences of 
the abrupt consolidation of the state budget at a paradoxical moment. In fact, the number 
of unemployed teachers has increased a lot but, simultaneously, the number of teachers 
who are leaving the system due to early retirement, anticipating the deterioration of work-
ing conditions within schools and wage cuts, is also increasing. The education system is 
thus affected in two ways: on one hand, more disadvantaged youngsters are entering the 
system, requiring more innovative learning environments; on the other hand, the system 
is now losing more experienced teachers and cannot recruit young and qualifi ed ones.
The increase in the unemployment rate amongst the young and educated, together 
with all the cuts made in education has introduced potential disruption and other harmful 
effects in a country with huge shortages of human capital. Many families are starting to 
question whether it pays to be educated, while the social devaluation of the role of teach-
ers may compromise the renewal (and the quality) of the teaching workforce.
This diffi cult situation of the education system is a matter of concern, especially consider-
ing the low skills endowment in Portugal, despite its pre-crisis attempts to boost educa-
tion, training and skills as a major pillar of the Portuguese version of the European Social 
Model. One of our case studies in the next section looks at the skills issue in Portugal and 
the role to be played by social policy. 
3.4 Lack of Social Dialogue Disrupting Social Cohesion 
Another basic institution affected by the crisis and austerity policy is social dialogue. Most 
of the reforms (partially because of short-term pressures) have not been discussed or ne-
gotiated or compromises reached with the social partners, further weakening social dialogue.
Was it possible to do it any other way? Given the targets expressed in the MoU and the 
exigencies of the Troika in the periodic evaluations, maybe not. However, the existence of 
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intensive social dialogue, able to ensure the benefi ts of the investment in ‘agreement capi-
tal’ – which had signifi cant results in the 2000s – appears to be crucial. They are also fun-
damental to democracy. There is robust evidence that the institutions represented in the 
Troika have revealed no capacity to understand that the MoU strategy needed a complete 
revision in the EU recession in which it has been implemented. In such a recession envi-
ronment, new combinations of fi scal consolidation, social cohesion measures and timing 
for adjustment were seen as necessary. The risk of failure both of macro-adjustment and 
a return to the markets is very high, as are the social costs of adjustment.
In such a context, a large majority of citizens do not understand the ongoing changes, 
which contributes to a dangerous loss of trust in the state. The emergence of new forms 
of social contract and the recuperation of trust by citizens will, predictably, be very hard 
to achieve. Paradoxically, market economies rely on contracts and contracts rely on trust 
among the parties. Austerity measures, as they have been implemented, have undermined 
trust, especially in the state due to the widespread belief that the Portuguese state has been 
breaking contracts n for example, with pensioners and public sector workers – to comply 
with a contract with the Troika related to defi cit and public debt targets. The trust of the 
Troika and of the fi nancial markets is gained at the high price of destroying domestic 
trust. However, by the end of 2012 neither the fi scal budget as a percentage of GDP (–3.6 
per cent in 2008, –10.2 per cent in 2009, –9.8 per cent in 2010, –4.4 per cent in 2011 and 
–6.4 per cent in 2012) nor the debt/GDP ratio had fallen (increasing every year, rising 
from 71.3 per cent in 2008 to 123 per cent in 2012). This is diffi cult to understand, espe-
cially if the situation deteriorates constantly.
3.5 Rapid Increase in Poverty and Inequalities
Wages and income distribution policies have obvious effects on social equality and pov-
erty. Portugal is a very unequal country compared with other EU member states.42 An 
analysis of Gini coeffi cients in the EU member states (Figure 8.8) clearly shows Portugal 
at the top of the inequality ranking (the same applies if we use other common inequality 
indicators, namely S80/S20). 
Portugal has followed fairly different paths during different periods since the mid-
1990s (Figure 8.9) as regards poverty. High inequality, compared with the EU average, 
prevailed. In the late 1990s–beginning of the 2000s inequality did not show important 
changes despite some short-term variations. After the mid-2000s, however, a clear de-
crease in inequality is visible, clearly converging towards the EU average. But this ten-
dency was interrupted in 2011, the fi rst year of implementation of the Troika’s Memoran-
dum.
The inequality of income distribution goes together with high at-risk-of-poverty and 
at-risk-of-poverty-and-social-exclusion rates. Both are high in Portugal by EU standards 
(Table 8.3 and Figure 8.10) and have not shown signs of signifi cant decrease (nor in-
crease) in recent years. However, it is important to stress that the risk of poverty is not 
neutral with regard to different population groups.
Portugal has a particularly high risk of poverty or social exclusion among children 
(aged 17 or below): 28.6 per cent in 2011 compared with 24.4 per cent for the popula-
tion as a whole (EUROSTAT [il peps01]). Also the family structure has a strong effect 
42 In OECD (2012) a distinction has been made between fi ve groups of OECD countries. The highest inequality group (character-
ised by a high concentration of labour, capital and self-employment income and a high poverty rate) included six OECD countries: 
Chile, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Turkey and the USA.
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on poverty risk: ‘single person with dependent children’, ‘one adult 65 years or over’ and 
especially ‘two adults with three or more dependent children’ households are much more 
exposed to poverty risks than other household structures (the at-risk-of-poverty rate in
Figure 8.9 Evolution of the Gini coeffi cient of equivalised disposable income, Portugal, 
1995–2011
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di12] 
Figure 8.8 Gini coeffi cient of equivalised disposable income, Portugal and selected EU 
countries, 2006 and 2011
Note: Equivalised disposable income: total income of a household, after tax and other deductions, available 
for spending or saving, divided by number of household members converted into equalised adults; house-
hold members are equalised by weighting each according to their age, using the so-called modifi ed OECD 
equivalence scale. Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di12] 
Figure 8.10 At-risk-of-poverty and at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) 
rates, Portugal and selected  EU countries, 2011 (%)
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di12], [ilc_peps01]
The ESM in a Context of Crisis and Austerity in Portugal
317
Table 8.3 Poverty indicators, Portugal, 2008–2011 (%)
At-risk-of-poverty rate*
after social transfers 
At-risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion** after social transfers
2008 18.5 26.0
2009 17.9 24.9
2010 17.9 25.3
2011 18.0 24.4
Notes: 
* The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people with an equivalised disposable income (after social 
transfers) below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 per cent of the national median equiv-
alised disposable income after social transfers (EUROSTAT). 
** ‘At risk of poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) refers to the situation of people either at risk of pov-
erty or severely materially deprived or living in a household with a very low work intensity. The AROPE 
rate, the share of the total population which is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, is the headline indica-
tor for monitoring the EU 2020 Strategy poverty target (EUROSTAT).
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di12], [ilc_peps01]
2011 was 27.9 per cent, 30.1 per cent and 34.5 per cent, respectively, compared with a 
total rate of 18 per cent).43
Finally, it is important to stress the importance of education as poverty-preventing: the 
risk of poverty reduces with the level of education and the education of the parents has an 
important effect on children’s poverty risk. 
3.6 The Weakening of Traditional Portuguese Family Support
Pension cuts, even if progressive, are also hard to understand, especially as a persistent 
means of adjustment. It constitutes a sort of circle that closes up always with the same 
people inside. In the previous section we showed the impact on inequalities. At the same 
time, the family networks that traditionally provided an important buffer for Portuguese 
families in diffi culties seem to have been disrupted. As more and more members rely 
on labour market incomes the diffi culties of young people who are increasingly having 
problems entering the labour market, can less and less be supported by their parents (more 
and more squeezed by unemployment, wage cuts and tax increases) or by grandparents 
(pension cuts). At the same time, increasing unemployment, reductions in family income 
and uncertainty with regard to the future are compromising other long-term decisions 
of families. Among them and of the utmost importance is the decision to have children, 
which is crucial for intergenerational solidarity and the sustainability of social security.
3.7 Increased Distrust in the European Union 
A growing feeling of mistrust towards EU institutions is also emerging. The same Euro-
pean institutions that co-fi nanced Portuguese investments in infrastructure – among other 
things – are now blaming Portugal for having made these investments. The same EU in-
stitutions that recommended that Portugal increase service sector employment and reduce 
primary employment are now advising that unproductive employment in services is too 
high. The same European institutions that insisted on measures to fi ght poverty and social 
exclusion are now telling the country that cutting wages and social security provisions is 
43 EUROSTAT [ilc_li03].
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essential even if Portugal ranks amongst the more unequal EU countries. The EU is start-
ing to be seen as a very fragmented institution and a contradictory project, not dealing 
consistently with citizens’ problems. Not ignoring the national responsibilities and weak-
nesses that led to the present situation, this is surely also a European problem, implying 
a European sharing of the costs and a comprehensive strategy to solve the sovereign debt 
crisis?
4. CASE STUDIES: ILLUSTRATING THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES IN THE 
PORTUGUESE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL 
4.1 Case Study 1: ESM Changes: Shrinking the Middle Class in Portugal?
4.1.1 Introduction
One of the major discussions of the ongoing crisis concerns its effects on the middle 
class, the major supporter of democratic regimes. Despite the important discussions on 
the concrete meaning of the concept ‘middle class’ it generally refers either to intermedi-
ate income groups or to groups of the population that anticipate upward social mobility 
as an attainable goal. In Portugal, as previously mentioned, austerity packages have been 
implemented in a context of increasing structural unemployment and have been associ-
ated with a process of social, political and institutional instability. Instability can bring 
(in fact is bringing) increasing feelings of mistrust and lack of expectations with regard 
to the possibility of attaining a better future. This can compromise economic and social 
improvement but can also damage democracy itself.
4.1.2 A Context of Inequality from a Comparative Perspective
Portugal is a very unequal country in international terms, whether compared with other 
EU member states or OECD countries.
A general comparison of the current (2011) income distribution in Portugal and the 
EU27 average shows the particularity of the Portuguese case: Portugal has a more polar-
ised income distribution compared with the EU27 average (Figure 8.11). This polariza-
tion is characterised by:
• a higher income concentration in the top deciles in Portugal (decile 9: 14.7 per cent 
of income in the EU27 and 15.0 per cent in Portugal; and especially decile 10: 24.0 
per cent and 27.2 per cent of income in the EU27 and in Portugal, respectively);
• a similar share of income, in Portugal and the EU27 average, of the lowest decile 
(2.9 per cent of total income);
• a lower income share for intermediate deciles in Portugal.
Portugal’s situation is particularly unfavourable also by OECD standards. In a recent 
ranking of OECD countries according to inequality of household disposable income Por-
tugal was included in the group of countries with higher income inequality, together with 
Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and the USA.44 
44 OECD (2012), ‘Reducing income inequality while boosting economic growth: Can it be done?’, in Economic Policy Reforms 
2012. Going for growth.
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4.1.3 Increased Inequalities in the Most Recent Period 
The evolution of income distribution (Figure 8.12) in the past decade deserves comment:
• In the 2000s the income share of the top decile declined. However, in 2012 this 
share was higher than in 2011. Portugal remains the EU country with the highest 
share of income in the top decile (27.3 per cent in 2012).
• The share of the lowest deciles (1 and 2) does not show drastic changes in recent 
years.
• Deciles 3 to 8 (that, in a strictly income quantifi ed way, can represent the middle 
class as they refer to the 60 per cent of the population) with an intermediate income 
(meaning that they do not belong either to the 20 per cent that have the lowest in-
come nor to the 20 per cent with the highest income) appear to be maintaining their 
share of income in the austerity period.
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di01]
Figure 8.11 Income distribution, EU27 and Portugal, 2011
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di01]
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Figure 8.12 Distribution of equalised income by decile, Portugal, 2004–2012
Source: Author’s elaboration of Eurostat data.
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Looking in more detail at the recent evolution of income share by main income groups 
(low income: deciles 1 and 2, medium income: deciles 3 to 8, high income: deciles 9 and 
10) we can obtain a clearer picture of the effects of recent austerity policy (Figure 8.13A 
and 13B).
The contrasted effects of austerity policy show up very clearly: 
• Low income groups have a very low share of Portuguese income. However, the 
evolution of this share has varied signifi cantly in recent years: consistently increas-
ing until 2010 and decreasing afterwards.
• Medium income groups shared a higher percentage of income until 2010. After that, 
the income share of medium income groups remained almost unchanged.
• High income groups have also maintained a similar share of global income since 
2010 (in fact it has increased slightly) after a period in which their share of total 
income fell.
4.1.4 Public Sector Employees a Prominent and Representative Middle Class Group 
It is also worth stressing that public sector workers in almost every country – and cer-
tainly in Portugal – tend to be prominent representatives of the middle class. The prestige 
of public service since the time of the autocratic regime (diffi cult to enter but offering 
conditions of stability and career progression) has been reinforced since the 1974 revolu-
tion. The need for new services specially linked to the enlargement of the social functions 
of the state (education, health, social security) increased public employment. As the new 
activities needed a large amount of highly qualifi ed employees, a large number of high 
qualifi ed workers entered the public sector and in doing so reinforced its social status.
As argued in the fi rst part of the paper the PSM is mainly an outcome of the mid-
1970s. This has created a substantial job creation dynamic, absorbing a large number of 
the highly educated (namely in the education and health care systems). This means that 
the increase in the level of education of the Portuguese population has gone together with 
an expansion of the social functions of the state. Public servants represent an important 
component of the Portuguese middle class and thus cuts targeted at them represent a seri-
ous blow to the middle class.
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Figure 8.13 Share of national equivalised income of different income groups, Portugal, 
2004–2012 (%)
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di01]
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4.1.5 Specifi c Effects of Austerity on the Middle Class in Portugal
How have the austerity measures affected income distribution in Portugal? How did have 
they affected the middle class? Existing estimates show an average reduction of 6.3 per 
cent in household income as one of the main outcomes of austerity policies in the country. 
The major contributors to this reduction are cuts in public pensions and public sector pay 
(net of contributions and taxes), as well as means-tested social security benefi ts.45  
The design and intensity of the different austerity packages have led to different effects 
on income distribution. Avram et al. (2013) conclude that in Portugal austerity policies 
have affected income distribution by means of an ‘inverted U-shape effect’, meaning that 
middle income groups contributed relatively less compared with low and high income 
groups. According to the conclusions of the study austerity in Portugal involves a high 
income cut for the bottom decile (higher than 5 per cent). The following deciles (from the 
second to the sixth) have experienced a similar decrease of around 4 per cent. The higher 
deciles faced a marked progressive income cut (around 5 per cent, 6 per cent, 8 per cent 
and 9 per cent, respectively, for the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth deciles).
In that same study an evaluation is made of the measures responsible for this outcome 
in the various countries. In Portugal cuts in public wages have been the more clearly 
income-progressive cuts (especially applying to middle and top percentiles).
In Portugal, cuts in public wages are shown to be the most progressive measure, rep-
resenting cuts in the middle and top percentiles. Public pension cuts are also generally 
income progressive in their design but had some particular effects compared with public 
wage cuts in that they affect all deciles, even the lowest. Their impact is relatively similar 
in the fi rst four deciles, increases for deciles 5, 6 and 7 and increases again for the upper 
three deciles. Cuts in social security benefi ts (other than pensions) show a regressive ef-
fect on income profi le: although affecting all deciles it affected lower more than higher 
incomes. With regard to measures on income tax and worker’s contributions they also 
had a transversal effect (with the exception of the top and bottom deciles) and particularly 
the middle deciles. As the authors report, ‘in the case of Portugal, this effect [the inverted 
U-shaped effect] is due to a combination of progressive effects from cuts in public wages 
and pensions and regressive effects from the reduction of the (real) value of means-tested 
social assistance’ (Avram et al. 2013: 16).
Beyond the income cuts and tax increases: low disposable income 
In the analysis of the austerity policies’ effects in Portugal it is necessary to keep in mind 
that median disposable income is very low in Portugal according to EU standards. A sim-
ple look at Figure 8.14 gives us the dimensions of the income gap between Portugal and 
its EU partners.
This needs to be kept in mind. Austerity in Portugal is hurting very low incomes by 
EU standards.
45 Avram S., Figari F., Levynti C., Levy H., Navicke J., Matsaganis M., Militaru E., Paulus A., Rastrigina O. and Sutherland H. 
(2012), ‘The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation in Nine EU countries’, Research Note 01/2012, European Commission, 
December, 2012.
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Increased homogeneity within income groups
Looking in more detail at the data on median income and at the cut-off values that sepa-
rate the different deciles additional information can be obtained (Table 8.4). In 2009 and 
2010 the increase of median income corresponded to particularly high increases in the 
income boundaries of lower income deciles (2009) and lower and medium deciles (2010). 
In 2011 and 2012 the reduction of the median income went together with a particularly 
strong decrease in the income boundaries of the lowest incomes (decile 1 in 2011 and 
2012), intermediate deciles (decile 4, 6 7 and 8 in 2012) and also decile 9 in this last year. 
This can be read as a sign of lower income diversity within these income groups. Con-
sidering the cumulative effect of 2011 and 2012, the income groups in which income di-
versity has decreased the most are deciles 1, 6 and 7 (by 6, 5.2 and 4.9 percentage points, 
respectively). 
Table 8.4 Annual growth rate of cut-off income, Portugal, 2009–2012 (%)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Decile 1 2.9 5.5 –3.4 –2.6
Decile 2 4.5 4.9 –2.0 –0.3
Decile 3 4.0 3.4 –1.7 –1.1
Decile 4 2.3 3.4 –1.5 –1.8
Decile 5 1.7 4.8 –3.1 –1.0
Decile 6 0.8 6.0 –3.8 –1.4
Decile 7 1.8 4.6 –2.4 –2.5
Decile 8 –1.3 2.3 –1.8 –1.5
Decile 9 –1.5 3.0 –2.7 –1.7
Median equivalised net income 1.7 4.8 –3.1 –1.0
Source: SILC [ilc_di01]
Lack of Upward Mobility
There is also evidence of lower mobility throughout the austerity period. This is visible 
in the EU27 as a whole but is more intense in Portugal: the percentage of the population 
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Figure 8.14 Median income, Portugal and selected EU countries, 2005–2012 (euros)
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di03]
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Figure 8.15 Transitions of income by decile, EU27 and Portugal, 2008 and 2011
Source: EUROSTAT, SILC [ilc_di30]
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remaining in the same income decile group (no change in Figure 8.14) increased by 3.8 
percentage points in the EU27 and 7.2 percentage points in Portugal in 2008–2011.
Increased immobility characterises all income deciles, particularly the intermediate 
ones (Figure 8.16). In deciles 3 to 8 mobility was high in 2008 (percentage of no change 
ranging between 24.4% and 33%, low behind the national average, 37.9%) and higher 
mobility corresponded to the middle deciles 4, 5, 6 and 7. Precisely these are the deciles 
where immobility has increased most: 12.1 pp, 11.1 pp and 10.3 pp respectively for decile 
4, decile 7 and decile 6. This means less opportunities to progress especially among the 
employees who belong to the middle income groups and so to the middle class.
Mass unemployment putting in question upward mobility
Portugal has a very high education defi cit, ranking at the bottom among EU countries 
with regard to the percentage of 25–64 year-olds who have completed at least upper sec-
ondary education (in 2012 this percentage was 37.6 in Portugal and 74.2 in the EU27).46 
However, the recent evolution (as described in Case Study 2) has been fairly striking: the 
same percentage was as low as 20.2 in 2001. 
The increase in unemployment among the highly educated has been undermining the 
upward mobility path that high education traditionally enabled. Education has historically 
been, in all European countries, an important means of promoting upward social mobility. 
Lower-income families aiming at improving the economic and social conditions of their 
young people found education an effective and secure investment, enabling them to enter 
more qualifi ed jobs. This defi nes a strategy of upward mobility that is a main factor in the 
development of a middle class.
The emergence of structural unemployment in Portugal has challenged this mobility 
in two ways: (i) increasing unemployment reduces family income (as do wage cuts, so-
cial security benefi t cuts and tax increases) and so diminishes the household’s ability to 
fi nance education and (ii) increasing and very high unemployment rates among the highly 
educated (the third highest in the EU in 2012 and almost three times that of 2002)47 makes 
investment in education, paradoxically, too risky in Portugal.
4.1.6 Concluding Remarks 
According to the above information and the previously presented recent trends in the Por-
tuguese labour market we can argue that austerity policies are hitting the middle classes 
hard, namely because:
• The unemployment rate is affecting the population as a whole. It is true that it has 
started to hurt a number of sectors in particular but it has been extending to other 
sectors, including services and is currently hitting the public sector. The existence 
of a high unemployment rate for university graduates, which has risen to an un-
precedented level,48 is one element clearly narrowing upward social mobility (in 
2012 the unemployment rate stood at 15.7 per cent and was as high as 11.9 per cent 
among those with tertiary education).49
• Austerity has strongly reduced family income and affected social mobility mainly 
in the middle income groups.
46 EUROSTAT, edat_[lfse_08]
47 EUROSTAT, [lfsa_urgaed]
48 However, it is important to stress that this rate still ranks well below the unemployment rate of less educated groups.
49 EUROSTAT, [lfsa_urgaed]
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• Austerity also affected the income distribution within quintiles introducing less in-
come diversity mainly in the very low and medium income groups;
• Austerity measures are signifi cantly concentrated on the public sector: cuts in wag-
es and pensions and promotion freezes have been implemented since 2010. Public 
servants, a core group of the middle class, have so been losing monetary power due 
to tax increases but also because of cuts targeted on them.
• Associated with this loss of income but also with a political discourse centred on 
the idea that the ‘privileges’ of the public sector are one of the main causes of Por-
tugal’s current problems is that public sector workers are also losing social status. 
This has become particularly evident in the case of teachers, who consider the po-
litical speeches of recent ministers of education as an attack on their professional 
ethics. They complain that it affects how students and parents relate to them. One 
result of this is an increasing lack of motivation in state schools.
• Recent changes have increased the working time of public sector workers and have 
introduced measures aimed at allowing lay-offs in the public sector.
The Portuguese middle class (whether represented by those with an intermediate level of 
income or by one of its core groups, such as public sector workers) appears to be con-
strained by the recent changes. Under pressure from the risk of unemployment, they face, 
if employed, wage cuts, social security cuts, tax increases, low probability of upward 
social mobility and possibly a decline in social status.
The existing lack of trust and uncertainty about the future do not represent an optimis-
tic future. This is fatal for the middle classes because it hampers expectations of social 
mobility. And as democratic regimes rely on middle classes a moment can arrive where 
democracy can be in danger, in Portugal and in Europe.  
4.2 Case Study 2: Dismantling of ESM Putting Portugal’s Future Skills Endow-
ment at Risk
4.2.1 Introduction
The ESM’s labour dimension in Portugal is strongly conditioned by the structurally low 
level of qualifi cations. Stocks versus fl ows is a metaphor we use to describe how the 
recent improvements in secondary and tertiary education enrolment rates, the signifi cant 
fall in the drop-out rate and the strong increase in the number of PhDs (used here as a 
proxy of advanced human resources) have not yet succeeded in inverting the structural 
low average performance of the Portuguese economy regarding skills.
The improvements observed in the past two decades and a half are globally the effect 
of public policies: fi rst, mass participation in basic and secondary education; more re-
cently, the fi ght against dropping-out and failure, essentially driven by the generalization 
of vocational education (double certifi cation of education and training courses, vocational 
courses, apprenticeship) and science policy. In the majority of these public policies the 
role of the ESF cofunding has been very strong, playing a systemic role in their intensi-
fi cation.
In this context of persistent low levels of education, the penalizing effects of the crisis 
and of disproportionate austerity measures have risked blunting the contribution of public 
policies. The results already obtained can only eradicate the structural problem of low 
skills in the medium term with a continuous improvement in fl ows. Interrupting these 
improvements is to compromise the sustainability of the needed structural change.
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4.2.2 Recent Improvements in Access to Education
The magnitude of fl ows can be illustrated by the evolution of the number of students en-
rolled in secondary education (Figure 8.17) and of gross enrolment rates in secondary and 
tertiary education (Figure 8.18).
There was a strong increase in the number of students enrolled in secondary education 
at least until 1996. Stabilization of the number of students enrolled in general (non-voca-
tional) courses began some years before and following a period of signifi cant decline has 
been stabilizing again recently. In the past ten years, a signifi cant number of students have 
been absorbed by a diverse set of vocational options, including technological courses, 
(dual) apprenticeships, double certifi cation (education and training) vocational courses 
and, more recently, level 3 vocational courses in regular schools.
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The evolution of secondary gross enrolment rates is also striking, mainly in the period 
from 1980 to 1996. It has since stabilised. The peaks of the past few years have a number 
of explanations: on one hand, secondary vocational courses managed to recover young-
sters already out of the system; on the other hand, as gross enrolment rates the numerator 
includes students in secondary courses who are not of normal secondary age. Tertiary enrol-
ment rates also reveal a stable rising trend, although slower than in secondary education.
The impressive positive evolution of fl ows has not managed to counterbalance Portu-
gal’s very poor skills endowment. One of the outcomes of this non-conformity between 
stocks and fl ows is an emerging dualism.
In a recent study published by CEDEFOP,50 the limitations of the skills endowment of 
the Portuguese economy are clearly shown. Comparing the incidence of medium and high 
qualifi cations in the labour force in 2010 with the projected change in percentage points 
by 2020, Portugal is the only country classifi ed as a ‘low level, low change country’: only 
30 per cent of the labour force had, in 2010, medium or high qualifi cations and the esti-
mated change by 2020 is by only 6 percentage points.
It is also worth analysing the ranking of Portuguese regions regarding the incidence of 
low qualifi cations,51 as measured by the percentage of people with at most pre-primary, 
primary or lower secondary education in the population aged over 15. Amongst the ten 
worst EU regions as regards these indicators are fi ve Portuguese regions, including Lis-
bon. For example, Lisbon ranked second in the group of the ten worst performing regions, 
at 64.5 per cent with at most pre-primary, primary or lower secondary education com-
pared with only 10.4 per cent in the best performing EU region (Prague). 
Looking at the skills indicator ‘number of people with tertiary education (levels 5–6 
ISCED 1997) as a percentage of the population aged 15 and over’, two Portuguese re-
gions are among the ten EU worst performing regions.
50 CEDEFOP (2010), Skills supply and demand in Europe – Medium Term Forecast up to 2020, Tessaloniki
51 European Commission (2013), ‘Mind the Gap – Education Inequality across EU Regions’, NESSE (Network of Experts in Social 
Sciences of Education and Training).
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
 o
f p
op
ul
at
io
n 
ag
ed
 1
5-
64
Population aged 15-64 having completed secondary education
Population aged 15-64 havng completed tertiary education
Figure 8.19 Population aged 15–64 who have completed secondary and tertiary educa-
tion, Portugal, 2000–2012 
Source: PORDATA, INE – Annual Estimations of Population and Employment Survey; series break in 2011.
The European Social Model in Times of Economic Crisis and Austerity Policies
328
Notwithstanding the weakness shown by these fi gures, the EU Innovation Scoreboard 
2011 refers to complementary and contradictory signs of skills endowment. The human 
resources dimension of the EU Innovation Scoreboard depicts the Portuguese economy 
as contradictory. Regarding the ‘new doctorates’ indicator, Portugal performs relatively 
well compared with the EU27 (above the EU average). However, as regards the indica-
tors ‘population aged 30–34 having completed tertiary education’ and ‘youth aged 20–24 
with an upper secondary level education’ Portugal ranks 30 per cent and 26 per cent, 
respectively, below the EU average. The high increase in the number of doctorates is also 
strongly correlated with the impressive positive change regarding international scientifi c 
co-publications.
Figure 8.19 (previous page) clearly shows the slowly increasing trend of Portuguese 
population aged 15 and 64 who have completed secondary and tertiary education, as well 
as their low levels at the beginning of the decade.
4.2.3 Improvements before the Crisis with ESF Support
Before the crisis (and with substantial help from the structural funds), a considerable 
number of public policy instruments targeted at achieving sustainable inclusive moderni-
zation of Portuguese society were launched. 
The objective of ‘inclusive modernization’
The fi ght against dropping-out, the technological and physical improvement of school 
buildings and infrastructure and the development of vocational education have been the 
main drivers of so-called inclusive modernization. The rationale has been to foster the 
modernization of fi rms to match the continuous improvement of skills fl ows and to ensure 
that, by means of training courses, the low skilled unemployed (essentially in construc-
tion and low wage sectors) can be redirected to other sectors. There have been encourag-
ing results even if the matching in terms of employability between these two drivers of 
change is far from complete.
Vocational education and training the key
On the skills front, the strong impulse of vocational education and training courses has 
probably been the most important policy measure because it has managed to motivate 
the return to school of people who had abandoned it and to prevent the dropping-out of 
youngsters still in school, but facing a high risk of leaving it before gaining qualifi cations. 
Regarding basic education, double certifi cation education and training courses have been 
the dominant approach. Concerning secondary education, vocational courses (cursos 
profi ssionais) offered by regular schools have prevailed. The apprenticeship system has a 
long tradition in Portugal and is the only dual modality involving work in the classroom 
and on-the-job training. Public investment in the modernization of basic and secondary 
schools, the most quantitative effort partially supported by the ESF, has contributed to 
this process.
Concrete results on school drop-out rate
The falling trend of the school drop-out rate from 2000 to 2012 (Figure 8.20) is a good 
example of ‘stocks versus fl ows’.
A clear falling trend, particularly for women, is visible and in 2012 was close to the 
established goal of 10 per cent for early school-leavers. But the really striking fi gure is the 
50 per cent drop-out incidence among men at the beginning of the decade. It illustrates 
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how problematic this phenomenum was. However, in 2000 the most powerful factor de-
termining dropping-out of school was the high probability of entering the labour market 
early. The capacity of the Portuguese economy to create unskilled and low paid jobs was 
very high. A model focused on low paid jobs seems to have developed because of the 
joint interest of employers and low skilled youngsters so that that some matching took 
place. However, this context has been changing throughout the decade. The capacity to 
create this type of job seems to have little future because of the structural change due to 
globalization and affecting low paid jobs. Available data on unemployment clearly show 
the low education level of unemployed people registered in public employment services 
(employment centres) and training centres (Figures 8.21 and 8.22).
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Figure 8.20 School drop-out rate, Portugal, 2000–2012
Note: 2000 begins a new series; 2011 – break of series. Source: PORDATA.
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A lower probability of low educated workers (re)entering the labour market
The high percentage of the unemployed with no qualifi cations or only a basic education 
among the unemployed is a penalizing factor for ambitious structural change in the Portu-
guese economy and for their reintegration for the reintegration of those unemployed into 
the labour market. It is true that unemployment rates for those with secondary and tertiary 
education has also increased dramatically in the post 2007/2008 years. But the probability 
of being reintegrated is much higher for this last group. By contrast, the non-educated are 
strongly dependent on the re-emergence of activities on the ‘old model’ (construction and 
basic retail) which are precisely those most affected by the deleveraging of non-tradable 
sectors and by the decline in credit operations. The need of a ‘social buffer’ or ‘shock 
absorber’ is crucial in order to avoid exit from the labour market becoming an irreversible 
situation for these population groups.
4.2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this problematic context, the policy instruments to fi ght school dropping-out and fail-
ure (focused on young people with a higher propensity to be involved in these processes) 
and to increase the level of qualifi cations of low educated unemployed people (mainly fo-
cused on adults) turn out to be crucial dimensions of the ESM in Portugal. The relevance 
of these dimensions is, on one hand, a question of democratic values: the need to mini-
mise the inequality of opportunities between population groups. But these dimensions 
are also relevant in instrumental terms: successful structural change in the Portuguese 
economy will be facilitated by more balanced qualifi cations between population groups.
However, the development of skills and education could be undermined by the abrupt 
fi scal consolidation driven by the bailout of the Portuguese economy and the condition-
ality imposed by the Troika. The education and training system is now facing the chal-
lenge of integrating young people with higher risk of not completing regular or vocational 
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Figure 8.22 Unemployment rate by level of education, Portugal, 2000–2012
Note: 2011 – break series.
Source: PORDATA, using data from Employment Statistics Surveys.
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education. Additionally, compulsory education increased to 12 years. Consequently, the 
system is under the pressure of working with more problematic publics in terms of atti-
tudes and motivation to learn. In this diffi cult context of progression of the education and 
training system, the effects of austerity are worsening the working conditions in schools 
and leading the most experienced teachers to leave the system.
After some promising years of good fl ows concerning enrolment rates, falling school 
drop-outs and dissemination of vocational education and training modalities in basic and 
secondary education, the system is under pressure from qualitative developments: the 
needs to work with young people at risk of dropping-out, to attract people already outside 
the system, to control retention rates and to prepare teachers in regular schools to adapt 
themselves to vocational modalities, all these qualitative developments are resource- and 
time-consuming. Schools and other educational bodies can hardly manage to cope with 
these new challenges in a context of doubts, troubles and uncertainty induced by severe 
and blind fi scal consolidation.
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The example of Portugal illustrates particularly well the combined effects and risks of 
the fi nancial crisis and of the austerity measures implemented as the bailout adjustment. 
First, the international fi nancial crisis hit the Portuguese economy in a period of strong 
structural change determined by globalization and the anaemic growth of GDP and pro-
ductivity, which by itself generated substantial job destruction in poorly performing fi rms. 
Demand for social protection was very strong in that period and a number of pillars of the 
ESM in Portugal were involved in effi ciency and sustainability-led changes, including 
social security and the national health system.
Then came the fi nancial crisis and the fi scal stimulus initially recommended (but 
quickly abandoned) by the European Commission. The vulnerability of the Portuguese 
economy and of the public accounts to the debt sovereign crisis was very high due to the 
combination of high and increasing public and private debt, low growth prospects and 
competitiveness challenges. The bailout austerity measures and the abrupt consolidation 
of public accounts signifi cantly reinforced the deterioration of social conditions and un-
employment fi gures which were already in place due to structural change in the Portu-
guese economy and the impact of the fi nancial crisis.
The fi rst lesson to be learned from the Portuguese bailout and associated measures 
is that one cannot ignore the stage of development of an economy subject to interven-
tion. The demand for social protection was already very high when the memorandum of 
understanding was signed and austerity measures began to be imposed. The ESM pillars 
were signifi cantly weakened when demand for social protection was rising and structural 
unemployment strongly increased, defi nitively inverting a long period of procyclical un-
employment. The high levels of structural unemployment mean that the probability of 
re-accessing the labour market is very low at least for a large group of low-skilled peo-
ple. Dismantling the recent and vulnerable dimensions of the ESM in Portugal in such a 
context will have very high social costs that will not be easy to compensate in the near 
future. In that context all the progress made in adapting the ESM to modern times and low 
economic growth prospects which were under way through effi ciency and sustainability-
led reforms risk being lost. Some of these reforms had been approved within the social 
dialogue between trade unions and employers but the austerity measures contributed to 
suspending that favourable social climate. Of course we can say that the competitiveness 
The European Social Model in Times of Economic Crisis and Austerity Policies
332
problems of the Portuguese economy would defi nitively lead to the destruction of a sig-
nifi cant number of jobs even if the fi nancial and sovereign debt crisis did not exist. Social 
protection would in any case be crucial in helping Portuguese society to solve that prob-
lem. What has happened in fact has been the deterioration of social protection precisely 
when it was most needed.
The second lesson is that one should be particularly aware of the dynamic negative 
effects generated by austerity. It is false that after implementing the austerity agenda 
everything will be ready for a recovery of the trajectory of growth and change. Austerity 
measures removed the rationale from the adjustment efforts that the Portuguese economy 
was already making before the crisis, transforming them into a ragbag of expenditure 
cuts with no strategic goal. There is a high risk that blind austerity measures will generate 
negative dynamic effects in the long term, penalising growth potential (many people will 
not return to the labour market) and leading families to ineffi cient allocation of resources 
(for example not investing in education). Internal nominal devaluation and the pressure to 
reduce wages also risk reducing fi rms’ incentives to innovate and to recruit more qualifi ed 
workers.
The third lesson concerns the risks of regression of social dialogue as a crucial element 
of democracy in Western advanced societies. The capital of trust between social partners 
risks being destroyed not because of confl icts between trade unions (at least the moder-
ate UGT) and employers’ representatives, but on the contrary due to the lack of trust in 
government decisions. This is a very harmful effect in a country facing a competitiveness 
problem that cannot be solved without long-term compromises. Social dialogue is the 
right institutional space to build that compromise and blind austerity is undermining it. 
Social dialogue is also a powerful instrument for spreading understanding of the need for 
austerity when needed and consequently for obtaining acceptance of it without the risk of 
social disputes, distrust in politics and institutions and threats to democracy.
The fourth lesson is that blind austerity measures are undermining the social cohesion 
that the Portuguese economy needs to complete the structural change that was under way 
even before the 2008 fi nancial crisis. The eradication of the competitiveness gap of the 
Portuguese economy, building a more knowledge-intensive and technology-based spe-
cialization profi le and reducing the weight of non-traded goods and infrastructure in the 
Portuguese growth model is a very tough process that cannot be completed by eroding 
social cohesion. The strong increase in structural unemployment needs a solid base of 
social protection and not its disintegration. It’s true that unemployment benefi ts can be 
more effi cient in avoiding the risks of voluntary unemployment often emerging in low-
wage contexts as observed in Portugal. However, the number of unemployed people not 
receiving any kind of social protection and the number of couples in which both the man 
and the woman are unemployed is now out of control. Besides this, Portuguese society 
is blocked in terms of upward social mobility, as we demonstrated in the fi rst case study. 
The cuts of public servants’ wages, pensions and social benefi ts in general, the interrup-
tion of career progression in public administration and the strong increase in taxes (direct 
and indirect) are now hindering social mobility. Uncertainty and the increasing number 
of unemployed young graduates are now pushing a large amount of skilled young people 
to emigration, provoking a huge fall in human capital in Portugal and a negative return on 
public investments in education in the past two decades. In this context, families and in-
dividuals are now revising their investments in education. Portuguese society, after a long 
period of low investment by families in education, was beginning to change. The risks of 
suspension or regression of this investment are now very high, which also contributes to 
blocking upward social mobility and undermining trust in democracy.
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All these lessons cannot be interpreted as a sign that Portuguese society rejects, with-
out understanding, the need to consolidate the public accounts. The high levels of public 
and private debt (families and fi rms) are well understood by the public, which is not una-
ware that deleveraging can be painful. But fi ve years after the 2008 fi nancial crash, two 
and a half of them under a bailout agreement, the negative effects of austerity are now 
well perceived as a burden that so far has not brought about a sustained consolidation of 
the public accounts. In fact, there is no historical example of simultaneous deleveraging 
and correction of balance sheets of fi rms, families and governments without painful and 
unnecessary recession costs. The fi scal consolidation of a small euro-zone economy can-
not be achieved independently of a solution for the euro zone as a whole. It is doubly dif-
fi cult to achieve such consolidation in a period of anaemic growth prospects for the EU. 
Notwithstanding the resilience of Portuguese exports in an unfavourable context, a fall 
in the public debt/GDP ratio requires a more favourable context for Portuguese exports 
to EU markets. Portuguese public opinion in general and the social dialogue partners in 
particular are beginning to perceive the painful adjustment costs imposed by austerity as 
in vain and not leading to a sound recovery.
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re
ve
nt
io
n 
of
 
ill
eg
al
 w
or
k.
To
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t m
or
e 
fl e
xi
bl
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
jo
b-
cr
ea
tio
n 
fr
ie
nd
ly
 
So
ci
al
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
Pe
ns
io
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 
so
ci
al
 se
cu
ri
ty
 a
l-
lo
w
an
ce
s
20
10
: I
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ob
lig
at
or
y 
m
ea
ns
-te
st
ed
 (i
nc
om
e)
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 to
 c
al
cu
la
te
 so
ci
al
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s
20
10
: F
re
ez
in
g 
of
 m
os
t o
f t
he
 so
ci
al
 se
cu
rit
y 
al
lo
w
an
ce
s (
in
 th
e 
no
n-
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
re
gi
m
e)
.
20
10
: R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 in
 th
e 
no
n-
co
nt
rib
ut
or
y 
sy
st
em
; 2
0%
 c
ut
 in
 th
e 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
gr
ou
nd
s 
of
 M
in
im
um
 In
co
m
e;
 C
ut
 o
f t
he
 e
xt
ra
or
di
na
ry
 in
cr
ea
se
 o
f 2
5%
 in
 C
hi
ld
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s 
(in
tro
du
ce
d 
in
 
20
09
) f
or
 lo
w
 in
co
m
e 
fa
m
ili
es
 a
nd
 e
xt
in
ct
io
n 
of
 c
hi
ld
 a
llo
w
an
ce
 fo
r h
ig
h 
in
co
m
e 
fa
m
ili
es
20
10
 to
 a
pp
ly
 in
 2
01
1:
 
pe
ns
io
ns
 fr
ee
ze
To
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
pe
n-
si
on
s s
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 to
 re
du
ce
 p
ub
lic
 sp
en
d-
in
g
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
ne
fi t
s
20
10
: a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 tr
an
si
to
ry
 m
ea
su
re
s i
nc
re
as
in
g 
th
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t p
ay
 fo
r f
am
ili
es
 w
ith
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 c
hi
ld
re
n 
ha
vi
ng
 b
ot
h 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 c
ou
pl
e 
un
em
pl
oy
ed
; T
he
 sa
m
e 
ap
pl
ie
s t
o 
si
ng
le
 p
ar
en
t f
am
ili
es
.
20
10
: c
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 n
et
 w
ag
e 
an
d 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
be
ne
fi t
 (
10
0%
 to
 
75
%
);
20
10
: R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
w
ag
e 
of
fe
r t
ha
t t
he
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 a
re
 o
bl
ig
ed
 to
 a
cc
ep
t
20
10
: P
os
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
cc
um
ul
at
in
g 
pa
rti
al
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
efi
 t 
an
d 
pa
rt-
tim
e 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
To
 r
ed
uc
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
to
 r
at
io
na
l-
iz
e 
so
ci
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, t
o 
pr
om
ot
e 
so
ci
al
 
ju
st
ic
e 
an
d 
to
 c
re
at
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r m
or
e 
ac
tiv
e 
jo
b 
se
ar
ch
.
So
ci
al
 P
ar
tn
er
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 re
ac
h 
an
 a
gr
ee
-
m
en
t o
n 
th
is
 is
su
e.
So
ci
al
 d
ia
lo
gu
e
 T
ri
pa
rt
ite
 c
on
su
l-
ta
tio
ns
/p
ac
ts
So
ci
al
 P
ar
tn
er
s 
an
d 
So
ci
al
 D
ia
lo
gu
e 
ha
d 
an
 im
po
rta
nt
 r
ol
e 
on
 th
e 
re
vi
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
la
bo
ur
 C
od
e.
 A
 T
rip
ar
tit
e 
A
gr
ee
m
en
t f
or
 a
 n
ew
 S
ys
te
m
 fo
r L
ab
ou
r R
eg
ul
at
io
n,
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t P
ol
ic
y 
an
d 
So
ci
al
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n”
 w
as
 s
ig
ne
d 
in
 Ju
ne
 2
00
8 
by
 th
e f
ou
r E
m
pl
oy
er
s’ 
C
on
fe
de
ra
tio
ns
, O
ne
 o
f t
he
 tw
o 
W
or
ke
rs
’ C
on
fe
de
ra
tio
ns
 an
d 
th
e G
ov
er
n-
m
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 th
e 
ba
si
s o
f t
he
 re
vi
si
on
. 
Ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 r
ol
e 
as
 a
 m
ea
ns
 o
f 
pr
o-
m
ot
in
g 
so
ci
al
 p
ea
ce
 a
nd
 t
ru
st
 a
m
on
gs
t 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
Th
is
 re
vi
si
on
 w
as
 a
 p
ro
-
ce
ss
 th
at
 s
ta
rte
d 
in
 2
00
5 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
st
ud
-
ie
s a
nd
 a
 la
rg
e 
ne
go
tia
tio
n 
pr
oc
es
s.
Pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
C
ut
s (
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
w
ag
es
)
20
10
: 5
%
 c
ut
 in
 th
e 
w
ag
es
 o
f 
po
lit
ic
al
 s
ta
ff 
(P
re
si
de
nt
, P
rim
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
an
d 
al
l t
he
 o
th
er
 p
ub
lic
 h
ea
ds
) 
an
d 
m
an
ag
er
s o
f s
ta
te
 o
w
ne
d 
fi r
m
s.
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 d
efi
 c
it 
w
ith
 tw
o 
m
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
: i
) t
o 
su
pp
or
t t
he
 fi 
na
n-
ci
al
 c
re
di
bi
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
co
un
try
 n
ee
de
d 
to
 
en
su
re
 i
ts
 r
eg
ul
ar
 fi
 n
an
ci
ng
 a
nd
 i
i) 
th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
of
 so
ci
al
 p
ol
ic
y
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ES
M
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 M
ai
n 
ch
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s a
nd
 o
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tiv
es
/d
ri
ve
rs
 in
 th
e 
pr
e-
Tr
oi
ka
 a
us
te
ri
ty
 p
er
io
d 
(c
on
t.)
 M
ai
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
/ c
ha
ng
es
 a
nd
 d
at
es
M
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
Pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
C
ut
s (
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
w
ag
es
)
20
10
: C
ut
 in
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f e
xt
ra
 p
ay
 (o
n 
gr
ou
nd
s 
of
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n,
 o
ve
rti
m
e)
. I
m
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 to
 a
cc
um
ul
at
e 
a 
pu
bl
ic
 w
ag
e 
an
d 
a 
pu
bl
ic
 p
en
si
on
.
20
10
: F
re
ez
e 
of
 n
ew
 h
iri
ng
 to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
 a
nd
 re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
20
10
: 1
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
ec
to
r w
or
ke
rs
’ c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
 S
oc
ia
l S
ec
ur
ity
 (t
he
 ra
te
 is
 n
ow
 in
 li
ne
 w
ith
 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
).
20
10
 to
 a
pp
ly
 in
 2
01
1:
 
C
ut
 o
f 5
%
 in
 P
ub
ic
 w
ag
es
. T
he
 m
ea
su
re
 w
as
 d
es
ig
ne
d 
in
 a 
pr
og
re
ss
iv
e f
or
m
: i
) i
t a
pp
lie
s o
nl
y 
to
 th
os
e t
ha
t h
av
e 
a 
m
on
th
ly
 p
ay
 h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
15
00
€;
 ii
) p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
 d
es
ig
n 
of
 th
e 
cu
t (
3.
5%
 to
 1
0%
);
H
ire
/fi 
re
 ru
le
s
20
10
: S
tri
ct
er
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ru
le
 1
 h
ire
 fo
r 2
 le
av
es
.
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 d
efi
 c
it
Fl
ex
ib
ili
ty
20
10
 to
 a
pp
ly
 in
 2
01
1:
Fr
ee
zi
ng
 o
f p
ro
m
ot
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
rv
ic
e;
W
ag
es
 &
 li
vi
ng
 st
an
da
rd
s:
 m
in
im
um
 w
ag
e,
 e
qu
al
ity
, e
tc
.
M
in
im
um
 w
ag
e
20
10
: M
in
im
um
 w
ag
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 (f
ro
m
 4
50
€ 
in
 2
00
9 
to
 4
75
€)
20
10
 to
 a
pp
ly
 in
 2
01
1:
 In
cr
ea
se
 to
 4
85
€
To
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t c
ut
s
R
eg
io
na
l c
oh
es
io
n
N
o 
re
le
va
nt
 c
ha
ng
es
 a
t t
hi
s l
ev
el
, e
xc
ep
te
d 
th
e 
lo
ca
l r
eo
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
of
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
; t
he
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
an
d 
on
ly
 th
e 
fu
si
on
/a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 p
ar
is
he
s (
at
 su
b-
m
un
ic
ip
al
 le
ve
l) 
ha
s b
ee
n 
ac
hi
ev
ed
; t
he
 in
fl u
en
ce
 o
f S
tru
ct
ur
al
 F
un
ds
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 in
hi
bi
t t
he
 fa
ll 
of
 re
gi
on
al
 c
oh
es
io
n;
 
be
si
de
s t
hi
s, 
th
er
e 
is
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
th
at
 in
te
r-r
eg
io
na
l a
sy
m
m
et
rie
s i
n 
Po
rtu
ga
l t
en
d 
to
 fa
ll 
in
 re
ce
ss
io
n 
tim
es
, i
nc
re
as
in
g 
on
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ry
 in
 e
xp
an
si
on
ar
y 
pe
rio
ds
.
Ta
x 
po
lic
y
20
10
: C
re
at
io
n 
of
 a
 n
ew
 4
5%
 ta
x 
br
ac
ke
t f
or
 h
ig
he
r i
nc
om
es
 (h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
15
0 
th
ou
sa
nd
 €
)
20
10
: I
nt
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 p
ay
 in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 n
ot
 p
ai
d 
hi
gh
w
ay
s 
20
10
: I
nc
re
as
e 
by
 1
 p
.p
. i
n 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
 th
re
e 
VA
T 
ta
x 
br
ac
ke
ts
 th
at
 b
ec
am
e,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 6
%
, 1
3%
 a
nd
 2
1%
; 
20
10
: I
nc
re
as
e 
of
 1
 a
nd
 1
.5
 p
.p
.(f
or
 lo
w
er
 a
nd
 h
ig
he
r i
nc
om
es
) i
n 
th
e 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
ra
te
s;
 c
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 ta
xe
s 
of
 fi 
rm
s
20
10
: I
nc
re
as
e 
in
 th
e 
fe
es
 to
 b
e 
pa
id
 to
 a
cc
es
s s
om
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
rv
ic
es
 n
am
el
y 
Ju
st
ic
e.
20
10
 to
 a
pp
ly
 in
 2
01
1:
 
- I
nc
re
as
e 
of
 th
e 
hi
gh
er
 (n
or
m
al
) V
AT
 ra
te
 in
 2
p.
p.
- C
ut
 in
 th
e 
de
du
ct
io
ns
 to
 in
co
m
e 
ta
x
So
ci
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
20
10
: T
o 
re
du
ce
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 in
 th
e 
H
ea
lth
 S
ys
te
m
 b
y 
a 
m
or
e 
ef
fi c
ie
nt
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
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 M
ai
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
/ c
ha
ng
es
 a
nd
 d
at
es
M
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
W
or
ke
rs
’ r
ig
ht
s a
nd
 w
or
ki
ng
 c
on
di
tio
ns
W
or
ke
rs
’ r
ig
ht
s 
(r
ig
ht
 to
 st
ri
ke
, 
et
c.
)
Th
e 
La
bo
ur
 C
od
e 
w
as
 re
vi
se
d 
in
 2
01
2
Th
e 
m
ai
n 
ch
an
ge
s r
el
at
e 
to
:
- S
im
pl
ifi 
ca
tio
n 
of
 fi 
rin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
;
- C
ut
 in
 o
ve
rti
m
e 
pa
y;
- W
or
ki
ng
 ti
m
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
- R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 se
ve
ra
nc
e 
pa
y
- R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 h
ol
id
ay
s
It 
w
as
 im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
2 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
So
ci
al
 D
ia
lo
gu
e.
 In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
01
3 
th
e 
C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l C
ou
rt 
de
cl
ar
ed
 th
e 
un
co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
lit
y 
of
 so
m
e 
of
 it
s d
is
po
si
tio
ns
 re
la
te
d 
to
 fi 
rin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 (c
on
si
de
re
d 
as
 n
ot
 c
om
-
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t S
ec
ur
ity
 a
s s
ta
te
d 
in
 th
e 
C
on
st
itu
tio
n)
 a
nd
 C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
B
ar
ga
in
in
g 
(c
on
si
de
re
d 
as
 n
ot
 
co
m
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 th
e 
rig
ht
 to
 C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
B
ar
ga
in
in
g 
as
 st
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
C
on
st
itu
tio
n)
20
13
: C
ut
 o
f 4
 h
ol
id
ay
s;
20
13
: C
ut
 o
f t
he
 p
os
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 h
av
in
g 
3 
ex
tra
 h
ol
id
ay
s a
s a
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 b
on
us
 in
 th
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
To
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t m
or
e 
fl e
xi
bl
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
jo
b-
cr
ea
tio
n 
fr
ie
nd
ly
So
ci
al
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
Pe
ns
io
ns
20
12
: 
- A
ll 
pu
bl
ic
 p
en
si
on
s w
er
e 
fr
oz
en
.
- A
n 
ex
tra
 ta
x 
on
 p
en
si
on
s w
as
 in
tro
du
ce
d 
fo
r p
en
si
on
s h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
15
00
 e
ur
os
 a
 m
on
th
 a
nd
 v
ar
yi
ng
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 le
ve
l f
ro
m
 3
.5
 to
 1
0%
);
20
12
: I
nc
re
as
ed
 li
m
ita
tio
n 
on
 e
ar
ly
 re
tir
em
en
t (
re
tir
em
en
t a
ge
 k
ep
t a
t 6
5 
ye
ar
s a
nd
 3
0 
w
or
ki
ng
 y
ea
rs
, e
xt
en
de
d 
to
 p
ub
lic
 se
ct
or
 w
or
ke
rs
). 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 p
en
al
tie
s f
or
 p
re
-r
et
ire
m
en
t s
itu
at
io
ns
. O
ve
r-t
ax
at
io
n 
of
 p
en
si
on
s (
hi
gh
er
 
th
an
 1
35
0 
eu
ro
s 
a 
m
on
th
) t
o 
be
 p
ai
d 
as
 a
n 
ex
tra
 s
ol
id
ar
ity
 m
ea
su
re
 (t
he
 c
on
st
itu
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 w
as
 
ca
us
in
g 
a 
bi
g 
de
ba
te
)
20
12
: s
us
pe
nd
s 1
3t
h 
an
d 
14
th
 p
en
si
on
 p
ay
 (t
he
 C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l C
ou
rt 
de
cl
ar
ed
 th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 u
nc
on
st
itu
tio
na
l b
ut
 
ad
m
itt
ed
 it
 in
 2
01
2 
as
 a
n 
ex
ce
pt
io
na
l m
ea
su
re
 re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
de
ep
ne
ss
 o
f t
he
 c
ris
is
);
20
12
: f
re
ez
es
 p
en
si
on
s, 
ex
ce
pt
 fo
r l
ow
 p
en
si
on
s
20
13
: C
ut
 o
f 1
4t
h 
m
on
th
 p
ay
 fo
r p
ub
lic
 p
en
si
on
er
s (
th
is
 m
ea
su
re
 w
as
 d
ec
la
re
d 
un
co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l b
y 
th
e 
C
on
st
i-
tu
tio
na
l C
ou
rt 
an
d 
so
 su
sp
en
de
d)
To
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
pe
n-
si
on
s s
ys
te
m
 a
nd
 re
du
ce
 p
ub
lic
 sp
en
di
ng
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 M
ai
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
/ c
ha
ng
es
 a
nd
 d
at
es
M
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
So
ci
al
 se
cu
ri
ty
20
10
-2
01
2:
 fr
ee
ze
 th
e 
no
m
in
al
 2
00
9 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
so
ci
al
 b
en
efi
 t 
in
de
x 
(S
B
I)
 w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
ba
se
 fo
r m
os
t s
oc
ia
l 
be
ne
fi t
s.
20
12
: C
ut
 in
 il
ln
es
s p
ay
To
 re
du
ce
 p
ub
lic
 sp
en
di
ng
.
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
ne
fi t
s
20
12
: r
ed
uc
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t b
en
efi
 t 
am
ou
nt
 a
nd
 d
ur
at
io
n 
bu
t a
ls
o 
re
du
ce
s m
in
im
um
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
pe
rio
d.
To
 re
du
ce
 p
ub
lic
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
an
d 
to
 c
re
at
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 fo
r m
or
e 
ac
tiv
e 
jo
b 
se
ar
ch
.
So
ci
al
 a
llo
ca
tio
ns
To
 re
du
ce
 p
ub
lic
 sp
en
di
ng
.
So
ci
al
 d
ia
lo
gu
e
Tr
ip
ar
tit
e
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
/p
ac
ts
Im
po
rta
nt
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t b
ut
 c
le
ar
ly
 le
ss
 im
po
rta
nc
e 
at
ta
ch
ed
 to
 so
ci
al
 d
ia
lo
gu
e
Im
po
rta
nt
 a
t t
he
 f
or
m
al
 le
ve
l (
as
 a
 w
ay
 
of
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
so
ci
al
 p
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